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Articles
Toward a Constitutional Law of
Crime and Punishment
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER*

INTRODUCTION

The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.t
Our Constitution is a charter of human rights, dignity and selfdetermination.f

It has become a commonplace that there are no meaningful constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law.' While proceduralcriminal
law is thoroughly constitutionalized, so much so that criminal procedure
has become synonymous with constitutional criminal procedure, the law

* Professor of Law & Director, Buffalo Criminal Law Center, SUNY Buffalo. Thanks for
comments and suggestions to Guyora Binder, Sam Gross, Tatjana H6rnle, Yale Kamisar, Bernd
Schilnemann, Rob Steinfeld, Peter Westen, and the students in my fall 2001 Constitutional Criminal
Law seminar. I owe special thanks to Sara Faherty, my most careful reader and least forgiving critic.
t Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioo-oi
(1958)); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 182-83 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Plunishment is 'cruel and unusual'. .. if it does not comport
with human dignity[.]"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (The Eighth Amendment "embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency"' (quoting
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).).
t William J. Brennan, Jr., Editorial, What the Constitution Requires, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1996,
at D13; see also President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002) ("America will
always stand firm for non-negotiable demands of human dignity .. "); William J. Bennett, A Call for
Dignity, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at AI9; Don Lockwood (Gene Kelly), SINoIN' INTHE RAIN (MGM
1952) ("Dignity, always dignity!").
i. E.g., Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1269 (1998); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335
(2000); Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An OpinionatedReview, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943
(I99); William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, too MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001);
William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES I
(1996).
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of crime and punishment has remained virtually untouched by constitutional scrutiny.
The failure to place constitutional limits upon substantive criminal
law reflects two common features of the constitutional jurisprudence of
the United States Supreme Court: the prioritization of process over substance and, relatedly, the prioritization of states' rights over individual
rights, where criminal lawmaking is taken to be one, perhaps the, manifestation of the power of governance most closely associated with the
states, the police power, which is also widely recognized as the power of
governance least susceptible to definition, never mind limitation.!
The time may be ripe, however, for the constitutionalization of substantive criminal law, for three reasons.
First,there is great need for constitutional principles of criminal law.
The war on crime of the past thirty-odd years has wrought havoc on the
traditional principles of American criminal law, exposing their fundamental weakness. The foundation of "mens rea" and "actus reus" in
common law precedent did not stand in the way of the transformation of
criminal law into a system of risk administration, which began over a century ago with the medicalization and bureaucratization of criminal law
and culminated in the war on crime, an increasingly ambitious social control program launched by President Richard Nixon and continued, and
continually expanded, by succeeding administrations that eventually encompassed all levels of American government.3
The venerable principles of common criminal law-imported from
foreign soil and associated with an undemocratic, unrepublican system of
governance that regarded criminal law as an order maintenance system,
where they long ago had been eviscerated through the gradual displacement of common law crimes by statutory crimes-crumbled under the
pressure of crime waves and crime scares, political opportunism and
populist one-up-manship. After a gradual, but accelerating, process of
evisceration that I have described elsewhere in some detail,4 the once
vaunted principles of the English common law eventually came, at best,
to retain a largely antiquarian significance, as relics from a mythical time
when mens rea meant mens rea and actus reus, actus reus. At worst, they
2. Federalism and process fetishism go hand-in-hand because federal constitutional oversight of
a state's procedural application of its criminal laws is thought to be less intrusive than oversight of the
making of the laws in the first place. On the police power, see generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE
POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2004).
3. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS'
RIGHTS 13-31 (2002).

4. Id. at 13-147; see also Markus Dirk Dubber, PolicingPossession: The War on Crime and the

End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

829 (2001).
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helped to legitimize the transmogrification of modern criminal law, as
they stood for the reassuring notion that in the realm of "real" criminal
law-of "true" or "traditional" crimes-the world was still in order,
while outside, on the "periphery," strict liability crimes spread in open
defiance of the mens rea requirement, possession offenses flouted the
purportedly non-negotiable act requirement, and defenses, like insanity
and intoxication, were either crippled or eliminated altogether.
Second, not only is there great need for reconceiving the principles
of American criminal law-there recently have been signs, however disparate and tentative, that the tide has begun to turn. Crime rates have
leveled off, and so has the rhetoric of the war on crime.' Bellicose emotions have found a new outlet, the war on terrorism, which is now pursued with a singularity and commonality of purpose familiar from the
war on crime only a few years ago.
The war on terrorism, besides taking some pressure off the war on
crime, also has obvious relevance for the recovery of criminal law after
the crime war. I do not mean the direct implications for domestic criminal law of the widespread campaign to identify and root out "terrorists"
(and those "associated" with them).6 Instead, I have in mind the fact that
the global pursuit of the targets of the war on terrorism necessarily, if entirely unintentionally, brings American law into contact with nonAmerican legal norms.
For present purposes, the internationalization of the war on crime
implies the internationalization of constitutional criminal law. For instance, the question of the legal status of detainees at Camp X-Ray at
Guantanamo Bay ("prisoners of war"? "enemy aliens"?7 "enemy combatants"?8 "unlawful combatants"?9 ), which is currently before the U.S.
Supreme Court,"0 ultimately turns on the origin, and nature, of individual

5. Curt Anderson, Crime Continued to Drop; 2oo2 Levels Are Lowest in 30 Years, Justice De-

partment Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2003, at A6 ("Violent and property crimes dipped in 2002 to their
lowest levels since records started being compiled 30 years ago, and have dropped more than 50 percent in the last decade.").
6. Cf David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. & REUGION 267
(2001).

7. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959, 983 (2002); Enemy Alien Act of 1798,
50 U.S.C. § 21 (2002).

8. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 , 278-79 (4th Cir. 2002).
9. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
io. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F. 3 d ii34 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-334).
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rights." The rights of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are human rights
first, and (American) constitutional rights second. 2
The connection between constitutional and human rights deserves
greater attention than it has received. Long-standing American exceptionalism in constitutional law must go the way of similarly misguided
American exceptionalism in criminal law.' 3 While the United States deserves considerable credit, as a historical matter, for the establishment of
a constitutional system of government based on certain minimum guarantees of personal rights, the world has long since caught up with American constitutional law in the protection of human rights, i.e., the rights of
persons as persons, rather than as citizens, or residents, of this or that political community.'4 The protection of human rights in other domestic legal systems, as well as increasingly in the still emerging field of
international law, is no longer limited to grand pronouncements of grand
principles, as toothless as they were hypocritical. As the Canadian Supreme Court and the German Constitutional Court on a national level,
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on an international
one, have shown, it is possible to construct a meaningful constitutional
jurisprudence of criminal law within the framework of a system of human
rights that nonetheless remains respectful of the legitimate exercise of
communal self-government through the legislature.'5
Third, a line of recent cases indicates that the U.S. Supreme Court
may have reached the end of its aconstitutional rope, and that the irrelevance of the constitutional jurisprudence of rights to criminal law, the

ii. The same goes for the different, or not so different, treatment of citizen and non-citizen enemies in the war on terrorism. Compare Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278
( 4 th Cir. 2002) (classifying American citizen as "enemy combatant").
12. See Cole, supra note 7, at 957 ("The basic rights at stake.., are best understood not as special
privileges stemming from a specific social contract, but from what it means to be a person with free and
equal dignity. They are human rights, not privileges of citizenship .... ") (emphasis added).
13. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (discussing jurisprudence of European
Court of Human Rights); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (considering attitude of
"world community" toward execution of mentally retarded offenders). Witness also the recent rise of
comparative constitutional law as a discipline. E.g., VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUrIONAL LAw (1999).
14. Cf. Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and ConstitutionalRights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 210, 226 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).

i5. See, e.g., Bruce P. Archibald, The Constitutionalizationof the General Part of Criminal Law,
67 CAN. BAR REV. 403 (1988); Tatjana Hbrnle, Human Rights Issues in the General Part of Substantive
Criminal Law: German Constitution, Penal Code and Court Practice (2002) (unpublished paper, on
file with author) (regarding Germany and ECHR); Ivo APPEL, VERFASSUNO UND STRAFE: ZU DEN VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN GRENZEN STAATLICHEN STRAFEN, BAND 765 (Duncker & Humblot GmbH 1998)
(on file with Hastings Law Journal)(same); KLAUS TIEDEMANN, VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND STRAFRECHT
(C.F. Miller Juristischer Verlag i99I) (same).
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area of law that poses the greatest threat to these rights, cannot be sustained after decades of the war on crime. Prominent examples of this
trend include City of Chicago v. Morales, 6 where the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to an important aspect of the constitutional principle of legality-the principle of specificity (also known as "void-forvagueness")-by striking down a Chicago gang loitering ordinance. The
following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey,'7 the Court-to the great surprise of most commentators-struck down a state "hate crimes" statute
that authorized a judge to dramatically increase the maximum sentence
following a determination of guilt. Apprendi was followed by a remarkable duo of death penalty cases, Atkins v. Virginia'" and Ring v. Arizona,' 9 where the Court invalidated, in one case, a state statute that
permitted the execution of mentally retarded persons and, in the other, a
state statute that placed the ultimate death sentencing decision in the
hands of a judge, rather than a jury-thus extending Apprendi to capital
sentencing. Finally, and most recently, there is the Court's momentous
decision last term, in Lawrence v. Texas, to strike down the Texas criminal sodomy statute. 0
The three most recent decisions, Atkins, Ring, and Lawrence, are
particularly significant. In all three, the Supreme Court reversed course,
overruling recent hands-off decisions.' Ring confirmed that the Court's
decision in Apprendi was not a fluke, and indeed reflected a general
trend toward reconsidering the constitutional constraints upon criminal
lawmaking. In doing so, Ring also challenged the significance of a line
that in recent decades had shielded the vast bulk of criminal law from
constitutional scrutiny-the line separating the death penalty from all
other punishments. By reiterating the truism that "death is different," 2
the Court had managed to limit the constitutional law of crime and punishment to the constitutional law of murder and death. While Ring reintoned the familiar refrain of the uniqueness of capital punishment, it did
not put it to its familiar insulating use. For Ring extended the principle in
Apprendi, that the jury, not the judge, must make factual findings increasing the maximum sentence, from noncapital to capital cases. 3
I6. 527 U.S. 41, 64 (i999).
I7.530 U.S. 466,497 (2000).
I8. 536 U.S. 304,321 (2002).

19. 536 U.S. 584, 609

(2002).

20. 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
21. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at

2484 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Ring,
536 U.S. at 589 (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (99o), "in relevant part"); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 320-21 (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)).
22. Ring, 536 U.S. at 587.
23. Id. at 6o9.
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More dramatically, the Court in Lawrence went out of its way not
merely to overrule, but entirely to disavow, its 1986 decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick, which had upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's criminal
sodomy statute against a due process attack. Lawrence accused the Bowers Court of "fail[ing] to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake" and
"demean[ing] the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse."24 The Court concluded that "Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today."25
Most important, Atkins, Ring, and Lawrence suggest not only that
the constitutional irrelevance for American criminal law might finally be
overcome, but also how. Atkins refocused doctrinal attention on the rich,
and largely unexplored, substantive core of the Eighth Amendment's6
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments: the dignity of the person.2
A new constitutional law of crime and punishment requires no more, and
no less, than recognizing this fundamental principle in its full scope and
working out its implications for the criminal process in all of its aspects,
from the definition of norms (the realm of substantive criminal law) to
their application (the domain of procedural criminal law) to their enforcement (the sphere of prison law).27
Lawrence makes clear that the principle of dignity underlies not only
the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments clause, but the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clause as well: "It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon [a homosexual] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."28 The gist of
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is simply that, contra Bowers, even
"persons in a homosexual relationship" are entitled to "the respect the
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person."29
24. 123 S. Ct. at 2478.

25. Id. at 2484.
26. 536 U.S. at 311 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioo-oi (1958)) (discussing "dignity of
man").

27. This Article focuses on constitutional substantive criminal law. For some suggestive preliminary work on constitutional prison law, see Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity:
Reaching a Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU L. REV. 857 (1992); Richard G. Singer, Privacy,
Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning ConstitutionalAspects of the
Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 669 (972). There is of course a vast literature
and jurisprudence on constitutional criminal procedure. Still, much work remains to be done in this
area as well, for constitutional criminal procedure has remained oddly undertheorized. See Markus
Dirk Dubber, The Criminal Trial and the Legitimation of Punishment, in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TRUTH
AND DUE PROCESS (R.A. Duff et al. eds., forthcoming 2004).
28. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2477 (2003).
29. Id. at 2481-82.
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To appreciate the full reach and depth of the principle of human
dignity, it is important to recognize that the principle underlies not only
the protection against cruel and unusual punishments and the guarantee
of due process of law, but the Constitution, and in fact the American system of government, as a whole. What is at stake is the basic principle of
legitimacy of the American state, and of all modem liberal states: autonomy, or self-determination. 0 "Liberty," as the Court put it in Lawrence,
"presumes an autonomy of self."3' Every person has dignity, and enjoys
the right to have dignity respected by her fellow humans, regardless
whether they act in their own behalf or in the name of "the state" or "the
criminal justice system," not because she was born into a particular position in the social hierarchy or into a specific political community, nor because she achieved that status after birth, but because she is a person,
period. The dignity that is protected by the Eighth Amendment, the Due
Process Clause, and American constitutions, federal and state, is not social dignity, but human dignity, a property shared by all persons as such.
It is not a dignity that is bestowed upon persons, either by other persons
or by "the state" or "society" or some community or other, and that
therefore can be taken away. It is a dignity that exists entirely independently of political and social institutions; it is a moral, as opposed to an
ethical or political, property.32
Once we recognize the basis of human dignity in the concept of the
person, understood as an individual possessed of the capacity for autonomy, or self-government, the connection between the challenge of constitutional criminal law in the United States and in other legal systems, as
well as in international law, becomes clear. The protection of autonomy,
or liberty, is not, or no longer, a uniquely American aspiration. It is a
central task facing any legal system that seriously grapples with the
promise of self-government underlying the modern liberal state. More
specifically, it is a problem familiar to any court that exercises the power
of constitutional review once restricted to American courts, and-most
prominently, but not exclusively-the United States Supreme Court. The
problem of constitutional criminal law arises in any constitutional state
30. For recognition of "personal dignity and autonomy" as "central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment," see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (regarding abortion); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744 (997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (regarding
assisted suicide). For an earlier, and unjustly neglected, application of this notion to criminal law, see
David A.J. Richards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13
GA. L. REV. 1395 (I979).
3r. 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
32. For a modem discussion of the distinction between (abstract) morality and (substantive) ethics, see Jurgen Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse
Ethics?, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 195 (1989).
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that takes autonomy seriously, no matter how the protections of that
autonomy are phrased in constitutional documents drafted in specific,
and specifically different, historical and political circumstances. (The
German Constitution speaks in terms of "human dignity,"33 the Canadian
Charter safeguards "the right to life, liberty and security of the person"
against interference inconsistent with "the fundamental principles of justice"34 and proscribes punishments "degrading to human dignity,"35 the
European Convention on Human Rights, another product of the twenti''6
eth century, guarantees every person a "right to liberty and security, ,
while the much earlier U.S. Constitution strives to "establish justice" and
"secure the Blessings of Liberty," protects a person's "life, liberty, or
property" against deprivation without "due process of law," recognizes
rights "retained by the people" and citizens' "privileges or immunities,"
and prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments."37 )
Framing the task of constitutional criminal law as drawing out the
implications of the fundamental constitutional principle of personal dignity for the criminal process, including its substantive aspects, is nothing
new. This has been the approach of the Canadian Supreme Court and
the German Constitutional Court, as well as the European Court of Human Rights. A little closer to home, it has been the approach that has
animated much of the U.S. Supreme Court's spotty jurisprudence of constitutional criminal law, as well as its comprehensive jurisprudence of
constitutional criminal procedure. s Further, it has been the approach of
many state supreme courts that, unhampered by federalist concerns,
33. ART. I GG (entitled "Protection of Human Dignity"). On the implications of the constitutional guarantee of human dignity for German criminal law, see STRAFRECHT UND MENSCHENWURDE
(Cornelius Prittwitz & loannis Manoledakis eds., 1998). See also Il-Su Kim, Die Bedeutung der
MenschenwOrde im Strafrecht (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Munich University) (on file
with author).
34. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 7.
The Canadian Supreme Court has held that this guarantee "encompasses notions of personal autonomy (at least with respect to the right to make choices concerning one's own body), control over one's
physical and psychological integrity which is free from state interference, and basic human dignity."
Rodriguez v. Att'y Gen. of British Columbia, [1993] S.C.R.519,521 (upholding criminal prohibition of
assisted suicide); see also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 164, 166-67 (Wilson, J., concurring)
(striking down criminal prohibition of abortion, linking right to liberty guaranteed in § 7 to human
dignity).
35. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 12;
see, e.g., R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.R. 1045, 1049 (striking down mandatory minimum sentence of seven
years imprisonment for drug importation).
36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 195o, art. 5(I), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
["European Convention on Human Rights"].
37. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; id. at amends. V, VIII, IX, XIV.
38. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 14, at 145, 173.
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have scrutinized their state's criminal law far more closely than has their
federal analogue.39 In fact, we will find traces of this approach even in the
federal Supreme Court's handling of federal criminal law which, though
generally careful to steer clear of constitutional law, has imposed considerable, if not always consistent, limits on the federal criminal lawmaking
power of the federal legislature.'
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of previous work on American constitutional criminal law. It argues that these
recurrent attempts, while stimulating and well-intentioned, have failed to
articulate a principle, or set of principles, that could trigger, structure,
and sustain comprehensive constitutional scrutiny of American criminal
law.
Part II lays out the general conceptual framework underlying a constitutional regime of criminal law. After briefly sketching the generally
comparative approach driving the argument for a new constitutional
criminal law, it introduces the concept of personal-as opposed to social-dignity and highlights the connection between dignity and the right
to autonomy.
The Article closes, in Part III, by sketching the general outline of a
system of constitutional criminal law based on the principle of personal
dignity, which requires that every individual-suspect, defendant, offender, and victim-be treated with respect for his autonomy as a person.
For purposes of illustration, the principle is applied to certain central
topics in the general part and the special part of American criminal law,
which deal with the general principles of criminal liability and specific offenses, respectively.
I.
A.

HENRY HART AND THE SUPREME COURT

HART'S AIMS AND AMBITIONS: CULPABILITY

The idea of a constitutional criminal law, the conviction that crime
and its punishment cannot be matters of indifference to constitutional
law, has received intermittent attention in American legal scholarship for
half a century. The starting point, and in many ways the high point, of the
constitutional criminal law literature was Henry Hart's justly celebrated
1958 essay The Aims of the Criminal Law.4 Ironically, Hart's article was

39. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998) (striking down state sodomy statute upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
40. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (holding mens rea required as a

matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutional right).
41. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
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not about constitutional criminal law.' Hart in this piece set out to provide a comprehensive overview of the principles-or, given his consequentialist outlook, the "aims"-governing the criminal process as a
whole. In 1958, the drafting of the Model Penal Code was well underway,
and Hart sought to make a contribution to this great project of law reform and revision undertaken by his fellow Legal Process traveler, and
casebook co-author, Herbert Wechsler. It is no accident that the article
ends not with a call for the constitutionalization of criminal law, but with
a proposed revision of section 1.02 of the Model Code, dealing with the
purposes of punishment-or penal treatment, as the Code drafters would
have put it.43
Since Hart was not primarily concerned with constitutional criminal
law, it is no surprise, perhaps, that he devoted little time to explain just
what a constitutional criminal law might look like. He mercilessly chided
the Supreme Court for not developing a jurisprudence of constitutional
criminal law, but did not do much to develop one of his own. The closest
thing to a principle of constitutional criminal law in the essay is Hart's
repeated suggestion that punishment implies blame and therefore requires blameworthiness." Why punishment should imply blame, or just
what he meant by blameworthiness, Hart did not explain. Clearly, he was
no friend of Supreme Court opinions that either affirmed the constitutionality of strict liability crimes or read mens rea requirements into federal statutes, though for what he considered the wrong reasons.45
42. This is why a recent, belated, attack on Hart's essay by Louis Bilionis is beside the point.
Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MIcH. L. REV. 1269
(1998). Bilionis's article provocatively chides Hart for being provocative, and one-sidedly accuses him
of being one-sided. Id. at 1288. Bilionis goes so far as to propose a comprehensive approach to constitutional criminal law on the basis of what may be the worst reasoned, and least considered, of the
Court's undistinguished opinions in this area, United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (943), and
the one that-not coincidentally-attracted the lion's share of Hart's derision. Id. at 1291. It should be
noted, however, that Bilionis on another occasion has expressed considerable sympathy for the construction of a substantive constitutional theory of the Eighth Amendment very much in line with the
argument of this Article, though he applies it only to capital punishment, rather than to criminal law
generally. Louis D. Bilionis, Eighth Amendment Meanings From the ABA's Moratorium Resolution, 6i
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 31-32 (i998) (discussing Brennan's view of the Eighth Amendment as
protecting "common human dignity").
43. The drafters'-and the Code's-euphemistic preference for talk of "treatment" and "correction" over "punishment" did not escape Hart's attention. Hart, supra note 41, at 425-27, 44o-41; see
also Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 53, 68-73 (2002).
44. Hart, supra note 41, at 432 n.70 ("[I1t is a general principle of our law that criminal condemnation imports moral blameworthiness.").
45. Hart's criticism of the Morissette decision is telling. In that case, the Court found an implied
mens rea requirement in a federal conversion statute that included no such requirement on its face. It
did not reach this result on constitutional grounds, but as a matter of statutory interpretation of a federal statute by the highest federal court. Hart's main criticism of the decision was not that it side-
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Likewise, he criticized the Court for failing to see that the Constitution
could not be agnostic on the all-important issue of what can count as an
"offense," and therefore surely must place some limits on the legislature's discretion to attach that label to certain conduct. Once again, Hart
was less forthcoming, however, in clarifying just where that line should
be drawn, and why.
Besides these rather bare exhortations directed at the Supreme
Court to recognize some -any -constitutional constraints on mens rea
and actus reus-and on the general and special parts of criminal lawHart's essay contains a suggestive, but similarly unexplored, remark
about the unappreciated substantive potential of the explicit constitutional principle of prospectivity:
Ex post facto clauses are the only important express substantive limitation usually found in American constitutions. It should be noticed,
however, that the principles of just punishment implicit in such clauses
have relevance in other situations than that only of condemnation under an after-the-fact enactment-a wider relevance than courts have
yet recognized. 46
Even this suggestion, however, was more of an admonition of the
(federal and state) judiciary, than the kernel of a theory of constitutional
criminal law. Not only is it relegated to a footnote, but Hart nowhere explains what "the principles of just punishment implicit in such clauses"
might be.47 Clearly, this is the sort of thing a comprehensive account of
constitutional criminal law would be expected to provide.
On the topic of constitutional criminal law, Hart's essay thus probably is best read as a provocation, or perhaps a manifesto, rather than as a
coherent account. At its core is an insight about the relationship between
constitutional criminal law and constitutional criminal procedure that
Hart characteristically formulates as a rhetorical question: "What sense
does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first place?"'"
This question aims at the heart of the process fetishism of American
constitutional law in general, and of American constitutional criminal
law in particular. It challenges the received wisdom that a good (or constitutional) procedure can save any state action, no matter how bad (or
unconstitutional). Edward Corwin captured the same sense of unease in

stepped the constitutional issue but that it produced a "discursive essay] on the law" where it would
have been quite enough simply to invoke a familiar doctrine of common law to resolve the matter-in
this case the defense of claim of right. Id. at 431 n.70.
46. Id. at 41 n.27.
47. Id.
48. Id. at43I .
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his classic article on The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil
War, half a century before Hart considered its application to the criminal
process: "The essential fact is quite plain, namely, a feeling on the part of
judges that to leave the legislature free to pass arbitrary or harsh laws, so
long as all the formalities be observed in enforcing such laws, were to
yield the substance while contending for the shadow."49
And it is a sentiment that underlies recurrent calls for constitutional
criminal law even today. William Stuntz, for instance, recently reiterated
the point, though in somewhat less categorical form, when he observed
that-assuming a detailed constitutional law of criminal procedure"special rules for criminal procedure logically require substantive limits
on the law of crimes."5 In other words, from the standpoint of the legitimacy of the criminal process, it makes no sense to constitutionalize only
one of its aspects, while leaving the logically, and generally temporarily,
prior one-that of substantive criminal law-without constitutional constraint.
It is obviously unfair to fault Hart for not setting out a detailed account of constitutional criminal law in a broad ranging essay on a different subject. Unfortunately not much has changed since then.
Constitutional criminal law scholarship by and large has remained content to follow in Hart's footsteps, both in substance and in approach. The
bulk of writings on constitutional criminal law have concerned themselves with the topic that happened to attract the bulk of Hart's attention, mens rea. Only recently has an attempt been made to spell out the
constitutional foundation of Hart's other, lesser, interest-actus reusthat other grand old common law principle of criminal law.'
B.

FOLLOWING HART, TRACKING THE COURT: BURDENS OF PROOF

In style, and not only in substance, constitutional criminal law scholarship has stuck to Hart's agenda, however spotty and haphazard. Hart's
discussion of constitutional criminal law was entirely framed by the Supreme Court. He criticized-and ridiculed-Supreme Court opinions,
and he admonished the Court to rethink its jurisprudence. 2 He did not
develop an account of constitutional criminal law of his own. His criticisms and witticisms were meant to provoke the Court into developing a

49. Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24

HARV.

L.

REV. 366, 374 (191).

50. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-CriminalLine, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES I, I (1996).

51. Finkelstein, supra note I, at 342.
52. Hart, supra note 4I.
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constitutional criminal law, rather than to develop one himself. (Hart's
expertise, after all, was not in criminal law.)
While constitutional criminal law scholarship since then has become
more constructive -and, perhaps necessarily so, less entertaining-it has
become no less reactive and limited in scope and audience. Reflecting a
general trend in American constitutional law scholarship, the object of
study has been opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the audience has been the members of that Court. Virtually no attention-with
some recent exceptions-has been paid to state supreme courts, which
have shown far greater interest in constitutional criminal law than has
their federal analogue. And so constitutional criminal law scholarship has
followed Supreme Court opinions on constitutional criminal law, rather
than vice versa. Commentators by and large have waited for the Court to
set the agenda. They are waiting still.
Occasionally the Court has taken up issues of constitutional criminal
law, without recognizing them as such. (Much, perhaps most, of the
Court's constitutional criminal law jurisprudence is accidental, as the
abortion and euthanasia cases illustrate. 3) And as surely as night follows
day, Court decisions on constitutional criminal law spawned a slew of articles dedicated to the specific issue resolved by the Court in the particular case, without ever getting around to developing a comprehensive
account of constitutional criminal law. Perhaps one reason for this absence is the Court's habit to reverse itself in short order on issues of constitutional criminal law, as in Robinson and Powell (actus reus),54
Mullaney and Patterson (burden of proof)," and in Rummel, Hutto,
Solem, Harmelin, and now Ewing (proportionality). 6 Other opinions
were not reversed, but instead left adrift "as a derelict on the waters of
the law."57 Perhaps if the Court had not sent its watchers reeling almost
as soon as they had begun to make another cautious foray into one corner of constitutional criminal law, someone might have begun the task of
assembling the bits and pieces of doctrine into a whole. Instead, these

53. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (regarding criminal assisted suicide
statute); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (973) (regarding criminal abortion statute).
54. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666 (1962).
55. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704
(1975).
56. Ewing v. California,

123

S. Ct. 179, II9O (2oo3); Harmelin v. Michigan, 5oi U.S. 957 (I99I);

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (I983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263 (1980).

57. This quote is from Justice Frankfurter's well-known dissent in Lambert v. California,355 U.S.
(957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It could also be applied to Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (952) (regarding Supreme Court's rambling and noncommittal foray into the constitutional
law of mens rea).
225, 232
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partial academic projects of construction were condemned to irrelevance,
and abandoned, as soon as the Supreme Court changed course, again.
A theory of constitutional criminal law that stands and falls with Supreme Court jurisprudence has other drawbacks as well. Substantively, it
echoes every bias in the Court's approach to an issue, and-worsemagnifies that bias by taking it as the starting point of theory building.
More specifically, the Court's failure to face substantive questions headon, and instead approach them indirectly from a procedural perspective
has made the construction of substantive constitutional criminal law difficult indeed.
Now the problem with a procedural approach to substantive issuesor, rather, with addressing substance for procedure's sake-is not just
that it is indirect, but that it is backward. Substance is logically, and temporarily, prior to procedure. It makes little sense to talk about how to
apply norms before figuring out what the norms are. The procedural
questions of who gets to decide who committed a crime (Apprendi)8 and
by what standard (Winship) 9 and upon whose proof (Mullaney) 6o do not,
and cannot, arise before the substantive question of what a crime is.
The perhaps best-known example of the Court's ill-conceived procedural jurisprudence of substantive criminal law is the constitutional law
of criminal evidence, and of burdens of proof (what are they and who
should shoulder them, defendant or state?) in particular. 6'
As it stands, the constitutional law of burdens of proof-clearly a
matter of process, not substance-turns on a fundamental substantive distinction, which itself faces no constitutional constraints whatsoever.
Apart from making a mockery of the constitutional law of burdens of
proof-since a change in concededly aconstitutional substance can guarantee the constitutionality of a matter of process-the resolution of a
procedural issue by reference to an aconstitutional substantive question
reduces the latter to merely instrumental significance. To be more precise, the substantive distinction between offense elements and defense
elements matters only insofar as it is significant for the proceduralconstitutional question of which elements the state must prove, and must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt (offense elements), and which it does not
(defense elements).
If we stick with the burden-of-proof issue for a moment, we can see
why this procedural problem cannot be resolved without first attending
58. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2ooo).
59. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (I97O).
6o. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 684.
61. Id.; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 197 (1977).
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to the substantial distinction upon which it turns. As Ronald Allen
pointed out some time ago, it makes no sense constitutionally to prohibit
the state from shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant on an issue it is not constitutionally required to prove in the first place. 62 If, to
take Mullaney, the state is not constitutionally required to recognize the
defense of provocation, how can it be constitutionally precluded from
shifting the burden of proving provocation onto the defendant? In other
words, if there is no constitutional principle governing the substantive
point (must the state recognize the provocation defense?), then there can
be no constitutional principle governing the subsidiary procedural point
(who must prove, or disprove, the provocation defense?). This argument
is generally referred to as the "greater power implies the lesser power"
argument. °3 We might think of it as the "substantive power implies procedural power" argument instead.
The problem here is not just that the primary substantive problem
remains unaddressed, but why. In the Court's view, constitutional law
has nothing to say about the question whether the state can do away with
provocation as a defense altogether because the defense is conceived of
as a privilege, rather than a right. 6, Upon closer inspection it therefore
turns out that while the substantive question is not addressed, it is nonetheless resolved, if only implicitly. Implicit in the Court's failure to see a
constitutional dimension to the question of whether provocation is a defense or not is an anachronistic view of defenses as state- originally
royal-privileges bestowed upon offenders at the discretion, and hopefully the mercy, of the state-originally the king.6' As soon as a defendant has a right to a "defense," however, the state no longer enjoys
unlimited discretion to do away with it as it pleases. Once the "greater
power" (of abandoning the defense altogether) disappears, so do its "implications," including most importantly the "lesser power" (of shifting
the burden of proving the defense onto the defendant).
The state-centered view of criminal law underlying the Court's constitutional burden-of-proof jurisprudence, however, itself cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. While the precise formulation of a
provocation defense-or any other defense-may well be beyond constitutional scrutiny, the core idea of the defense is not. Provocation at heart
62. Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasionin
Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977).
63. Finkelstein, supra note i, at 346.
64. Cf People v. Fardan, 592 N.Y.S.2d 162, 163 (1993) (holding provocation defense based on
legislative prerogative).
65. See, e.g., The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288 (1884) (holding murder defendants are not entitled to a necessity defense as a matter of law, but acknowledging availability of
royal pardon as a matter of mercy).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vo1. 55:509

is based on the recognition that under certain circumstances, a person is
not fully blameworthy for his actions because, while equipped with the
capacities requisite for personhood, he was prevented from exercising
them, and thus acts according to his personhood, his human nature, if
you will. He remained a person (and therefore deserves punishment,
rather than, say, treatment ), but he did not fully act as a person (and
therefore deserves less punishment).
i. Allen's ProceduralPrinciple of Substance: Proportionality
Perhaps the most telling evidence of the oddness of putting the cart
of process before the horse of substance comes in the form of the constitutional rules that result from this backward approach. Take, for instance, the patently empty rule that the state can shift the burden of
proof on any issue it designates as a "defense element," rather than an67
"offense element," first suggested in the 1952 case Leland v. Oregon,
and since cemented in a series of cases, including Patterson and Mullaney. Other attempts, by commentators rather than by the Justices, to
make sense of the Court's jurisprudence on burdens of proof are less
empty, but no less circuitous.
Allen, for example, proposes an alternative rule that, in his opinion,
better accounts for the Court's opinions in Pattersonand Mullaney:
If the courts conclude that a given punishment is not disproportional to
what the state has proved beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding
the presence or absence of any mitigating factors, then a defendant's
liberty interest would obviously be satisfied by a statute that required
proof of only those elements and that imposed that particular punishment.68
In other words, the Constitution prohibits the state only from shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant on any element without
which the prescribed punishment would be disproportionate. So, for instance, if all intentional homicides are punishable by life imprisonment
and that punishment is not disproportionate, then the state can shift the
burden of proving provocation-or any other mitigating factor-onto a
defendant who has been proved to have committed an intentional homi66. This is an important point. Respect for the offender's dignity implies a right to be punished,
rather than be treated, or eliminated, or corrected, as a condition or a dog might. See Markus Dirk
Dubber, The Right to Be Punished:Autonomy and Its Demise in Modern Penal Thought, 16 L. & HIST.
REV. 113, 115-16, 137 (1998). This right to be punished thus both grounds and limits the availability of
excuses based on incapacity or the failure to exercise one's capacity, including provocation, extreme
mental disturbance, extreme emotional disturbance, diminished capacity, intoxication, duress, military
orders, infancy, and, of course, insanity.
67. 343 U.S. 790, 798, 802 (952) (upholding constitutionality of state statute placing burden of
proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt onto defendant).
68. Allen, supra note 62, at 46.
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cide; the affirmative defense of provocation "after all could constitutionally be ignored." '
Rather than formulating a procedural solution to a procedural problem, this rule replaces one substantive rule with another. Instead of relying on the distinction between offense elements and defense elements, it
relies on the principle of proportionality. That substantive principle,
however, remains as unexplored as did the Court's definition of an offense, and of a defense to that offense.
Allen's roundabout rule does have the advantage of turning on more
than legislative labeling. Although the Court's offense rule leaves the
definition of an offense to the legislature, Allen's proportionality rules
leaves the definition of proportionality to the Court. But there is nothing
about the offense rule that requires leaving its substance to the legislature, just as there is nothing about Allen's rule that requires leaving its
substance to the Court. In other words, substantively speaking-as opposed to, say, institutionally speaking-the proportionality rule is no
more attractive than is the offense rule. Apart from the question of who
gets to decide what, both rules attempt to resolve a procedural problem
by reference to an undeveloped substantive principle.
More important, Allen does not reject the "greater power implies
the lesser power" thesis, nor the substantive approach upon which it is
based. In fact, the reason why Allen thinks the defendant's "liberty interest" is unaffected if the state forces him to prove a defense it did not have
to disprove in the first place is just that: it did not have to recognize the
defense at all, no matter who had to prove, or disprove, it. Allen's move
to proportionality thus cements the unexamined traditional view that the
state/king is free to grant or to deny certain, and perhaps all, defenses to
a defendant, at its/his pleasure, for offense has been taken either way.
If we were to approach the implicit substantive issues head-on,
rather than gesture at them from a procedural distance, we might instead
ask ourselves whether a defendant has a right to certain defenses, or
rather to have certain factors taken into consideration when the state decides to bring the power of criminal law to bear upon him. If we then
proceeded to the question of who should bear the burden of proof on
these factors, we might well decide-but need not-that the state may
not constitutionally shift the burden of proof onto an issue which the defendant has a constitutional right to have considered in reaching a criminal judgment. The point here is that, however we resolve the procedural
issue the primary, substantive, one must be considered first.

69. Id.
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Now, besides the right to certain "defenses," other substantive constitutional constraints might well end up informing procedural questions
like the assignment of burdens of proof. So Allen's reference to a proportionality principle was entirely appropriate, if underexplored. In fact,
in existing systems of constitutional criminal law, such as in Canadian
and German law, proportionality plays a central role.7' And as we will
see shortly, proportionality was the key, in fact the only, principle that
Jefferson worked out when he turned his attention to the reform of
criminal law in light of the constitutional principles undergirding the New
Republic.7
2.
Finkelstein (and Mill): Offense (and Harm)
Eschewing Allen's proportionality rule-and proportionality analysis in general-Claire Finkelstein recently has suggested how another aspect of the Court's procedural burden of proof jurisprudence might be
placed on a substantive footing. Rather than focusing on proportionality
of crime and punishment, or on the nature and constitutional status of a
defense, Finkelstein instead proposes that we consider the constitutional
status of, and limitations upon, the other side of the Court's formal offense/defense distinction, the notion of an offense.72 Finkelstein argues
that the state is constitutionally prohibited from criminalizing certain
conduct, in particular conduct that violates Mill's celebrated "harm principle."73 (And so the state cannot saddle the defendant with the burden
of proof on an element if without that element the conduct would violate
the harm principle and therefore could not have been constitutionally
punished.)
Note, however, that there is nothing inconsistent between Allen's
proportionality-based and Finkelstein's offense-based approach. In fact,
Finkelstein's attempt to place substantive limits on the notion of an offense can be seen as one way of putting meat on the bare bones of proportionality. To decide what proportionality between crime and
punishment means, it would help to know more about one of the concepts in the balance, "crime." Put another way, one way in which punishment can be (grossly) disproportionate to a crime would be if the

70. Alan Brudner, Guilt Under the Charter: The Lure of ParliamentarySupremacy, 40 CRIM. L.Q.
(1998); CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFREcHT: ALLGEMEINER TELL, BAND I, at 26-27 (3d ed. 1997).
71. See infra text accompanying notes ii4-2o.
72. Finkelstein, supra note i, at 369. Finkelstein also has explored the notion of a right to a defense. See Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligationof the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to
Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (i999).
73. Finkelstein, supra note I,at 371; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9-I (Elizabeth Rapaport
ed., Hacket Publ'g 1978) (1859) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others....").
287
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crime is not (or may not constitutionally be) a crime in the first place. In
that case any punishment would be unconstitutional, no matter how light.
The problem with Allen's and Finkelstein's approaches is not that
they are misguided, but that they are incomplete. Neither proportionality
nor offense (nor defense) can generate a comprehensive account of constitutional criminal law. That account can only arise from considering the
implications of the basic principle of justice that underlies a constitutional system of government, and therefore a constitutional system of
criminal law, human dignity based on the capacity for autonomy. An exclusive focus on proportionality will leave the substantive notion of an
offense and the right to certain defenses unexplored. At the same time,
limiting one's attention to the substantive notion of an offense may lead
one to disregard the culpability component of crime that not only distinguishes crime from other harmful conduct but also marks crime as a
uniquely human act, rather than an ahuman mode of endangerment or
pain infliction.74
Note, in this context, that the primacy of substance is often obscured
by the very way the doctrinal issue is framed. To characterize a particular
precondition of criminal liability as a defense, or rather the absence of a
defense, is not only awkward, but also gives it a procedural gloss. Further, it frames the constitutional status of the doctrine in a way that favors the state. For classifying an issue as a defense, by connotation if not
definition, suggests that it is something the state might constitutionally
do without-no one would suggest that the state could constitutionally
abandon an offense, in light of the legality principle-and, more specifically, that it is something the defense may constitutionally be required to
prove, after the state has done its part of proving the elements of the offense. For these reasons, such familiar notions as "defense," "offense,"
and for that matter "defendant" and "prosecution," must be taken with a
grain of salt in a truly substantive theory of constitutional criminal law.
3. Apprendi's Promise:Substance Over Form
Like its emptily formalistic burden-of-proof jurisprudence, the Supreme Court's recent evidentiary decisions regarding the right to have a
jury, rather than a judge, decide whether the burden of proof has been
met-no matter by whom, and no matter what it is-have obvious substantive implications. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the substantive distinction is not that between offense elements and defense elements, but that
between offense elements and sentencing factors. Unlike in Patterson,
however, the Supreme Court in Apprendi went out of its way to stress
74. Finkelstein in fact rejects a constitutional requirement of mens rea, or even of moral blameworthiness. See Finkelstein, supra note i, at 385-86.
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that "the constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 'elements' and 'sentencing factors"' is not dispositive, for "'[ilabels do not
afford an acceptable answer. '
This rejection of formalism is at least not inconsistent with a willingness to tackle the underlying substantive issue-the distinction between
offense elements and sentencing factors. Note, however, that the problem with Patterson is not so much with labels, but with the fact that the
labels are labels of substantive criminal law, and for that reason are
treated as beyond constitutional criticism. 76 The Court's focus on effect
over form in Apprendi surely marks a welcome change from earlier opinions, which were long on the latter and short on the former,77 but it does
not indicate, by itself, a revival of interest among the Justices in interrogating the constitutional constraints of substantive criminal law.
But whether or not Apprendi signals a change in attitude among
members of the U.S. Supreme Court is, in an important sense, beside the
point. Perhaps Apprendi does suggest that the Court has begun to shed
its troubling nonchalance (or worse, malign neglect) in matters of substantive criminal law. And perhaps the Court's recent reaffirmation, in
Atkins v. Virginia,7s of its commitment to exploring the concept of human
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishments can be read as indicating how the Court might decide to go about rethinking constitutional criminal law.
Perhaps not. Reducing constitutional criminal law to a search for
oracular signs from the U.S. Supreme Court makes little sense. To begin
with, the Court has been notoriously fickle when it comes to constitutional criminal law, taking one step forward and two back time and time
again.79 But there is another, more basic, problem with conceiving of
scholarship on criminal constitutional law as Supreme Court commentary
having to do with the nature of judicial decisionmaking in the American
legal system. It is blackletter law that judicial decisionmaking, even on
constitutional questions and even by the U.S. Supreme Court, is limited
to the case and controversy before a given court at a given time. Even if
one thinks that this oft-repeated point is largely of rhetorical significance,
mainly as a defense against critics of "judicial legislation," it does reflect
75. 530 U.S. 466,494 (2000) (quoting State v. Apprendi, 159 N.J. 7, 20 (I999)).

76. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
77. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (creating category of "sentencing factors" and providing it lesser constitutional protection regardless of effect on sentence).
78. 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioo-oi (1958)) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.")
79. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55 .
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a certain unwillingness - and often a failure - to take a sufficiently broad
approach to the issues raised in a particular case.
Following Hart in the Supreme Court's exploits also means disregarding the considerable and growing jurisprudence of constitutional
criminal law in American state courts. Despite the dramatic expansion of
federal criminal law, even and especially since Hart's time, American
criminal law remains, by and large, state criminal law. And as a result,
American constitutional criminal law has remained state constitutional
criminal law as well. By contrast, scholarship on American constitutional
criminal law has, almost exclusively, been scholarship on federal constitutional criminal law. The academy has been slow to pick up on the development of a constitutional criminal law in the state courts, some
notable - but largely unnoticed - exceptions notwithstanding.8°
What we need, in short, is a fresh start. We need to free constitutional criminal law from its previous doctrinal and theoretical baggage,
represented by the Supreme Court's undistinguished jurisprudence in
this area, on one hand, and by Henry Hart's provocative yet underdeveloped remarks, on the other. We need to face the constitutional law of
crime and punishment directly, without the distracting and secondary
concerns of procedure or federalism. Instead of amplifying or simply repeating Hart's call for the judicial recognition of principle, we need to set
out principles ourselves, and follow their implications throughout the
criminal law. Instead of trying to squeeze sense out of the Supreme
Court's ill-considered efforts on substantive criminal law over the decades,8 I we should point the way toward a systematic constitutional law of
crime and punishment, addressed to anyone who is willing to give the

8o. The LaFave and Scott treatise contains a remarkably, and unusually, in-depth exploration of
state constitutional criminal law. I WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL

LAW §§ 2.11, 2.12 (2d ed. 1986). For recent articles, see Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation
and the Limits of State PolicePower, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REv. I (1999); Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 521 (1998). See generally James A. Gardner,

Interpreting State Constitutions: A Jurisprudence of Function in a Federal System (forthcoming 2004).
81. Two of the most ambitious recent efforts of this kind, both concerned with the far-and-away
most popular topic in substantive constitutional criminal law, mens rea, are those by Richard Singer
and Alan Michaels. Having carefully analyzed the familiar string of strict liability cases beginning with
Shevlin-Carpenter, Singer concludes, echoing Herbert Packer, that "[m]ens rea is not constitutionally
mandated, except sometimes," Richard Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The
Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CursI. L. REv. 859, 943 (i999), while
Michaels concludes that "strict liability is constitutional when, but only when, the intentional conduct
covered by the statute could be made criminal by the legislature." Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional
Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 834 (1999). Perhaps the Court's cases can be read in these ways,
perhaps not. What is missing is an account of what the constitutional law of mens rea should be, as
opposed to what it can be read to be.
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constitutional constraints on criminal law some serious thought, be they
federal or state legislators, judges, or prosecutors.
II.

DIGNITY, AUTONOMY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

A. A COMMON PROBLEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The central question that constitutional criminal law must answer is
what limitations upon the state's power to punish are implied by the
commitment to the protection of personal-or human-rights that lies at
the heart of every liberal system of government. It is a fundamental
problem of legitimacy that must be addressed by any government that
claims the power to punish. It is not unique to the United States, nor is it
unique to the United States Supreme Court. In fact, in the American
context it is not even primarily a problem for the federal high court, since
criminal law is first and foremost the business of the states.
Even within the confines of federal law, the constraints on the law of
crime and punishment are not merely a question for the federal courts in
general and the Supreme Court in particular. The confusion in American
thinking and writing between constitutional law and the jurisprudence of
the U.S. Supreme Court is as pervasive as it is pernicious. The question
of judicial review surely is of great importance and deserves careful attention. But to reduce constitutional questions to questions of the authority of judges to review legislative enactments, and more specifically
of a group of nine federal judges to review state legislative enactments,
does not help serious consideration of the substance of constitutional
law."2 Ideally, everyone acting in some governmental capacitylegislative, judicial, or executive -will pay heed to the constraints constitutional law places upon her action as a state official. At any rate, the nature of these constraints deserves our careful attention no matter who
ends up putting them into practice.
At stake are the basic principles of justice that govern state action in
political communities based on minimum requirements of legitimacy.
These requirements have been familiar since at least the late eighteenth
century, having found their first official and comprehensive expression in
the foundational constitutional texts of the United States. Conceiving of
the challenge of constitutional criminal law as an American project-or,

82. For this reason, I do not agree with Claire Finkelstein that the first question a "constitutional
theory of substantive criminal law must have [an] answer[] to" is "on what grounds are federal courts
entitled to review criminal legislation pertaining to the substantive doctrines of the criminal law for the
adequacy of their content?" Finkelstein, supra note i, at 369. This way of proceeding, however familiar from American constitutional jurisprudence, not only puts the cart before the horse, but also stacks
the deck, so far decisively, against the development of the very theory Finkelstein envisions.
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even more limited, as a project of American federal constitutional law as
constructed by the U.S. Supreme Court-would mean underestimating
its scope.
To address the common problem of the constitutional limits of
criminal law, it makes sense to look beyond the confines of U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. This is especially true when, as it turns out, other courts
equipped with similar powers of judicial review, including American state
supreme courts, have made considerably more progress in developing a
jurisprudence of constitutional criminal law.
It is high time to overcome the parochialism of American constitutional law in general, and of American constitutional criminal law in particular. A comparative curiosity, however, should not be confused with
the attempt to transform American constitutional law into a species of
international human rights law, or American criminal law into a species
of international criminal law. To say that various legal systems today face
the same problem of grounding principles of criminal justice in constitutional law is not to say that this problem must have a single solution, in
the form of a single principle of international law. Each legal system
must find the answer to the challenge of constitutional criminal law that
fits within the particularities of its traditions, including the jurisprudence
of its constitutional courts. Conceptual approaches, interpretative methodologies, even specific principles cannot be transplanted from one system to another. 8 Comparative analysis may provide insight and fresh
perspectives, but it cannot replace the difficult and continuous work of
dialogue within the context of an existing constitutional discourse without which legitimation in a political community dedicated to self-

83. On the subject of comparative constitutional law, see Donald P. Kommers, The Value of
ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PRoc. 685 (1976). See generally JACKSON &
TUSHNET, supra note 13. For an earlier illustration of comparative analysis of interpretative methodologies in constitutional law, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Homosexual Privacy Rights Before the United
States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of Methodologies, 27
STAN. J. INT'L L. i89 (i991). There, I contrasted the U.S. Supreme Court's static head-counting approach to determining broad societal norms as reflected in legislatures' treatment of certain conduct
with the ECHR's directional analysis of legislative trends, as illustrated by the ECHR's decision striking down a consensual sodomy statute five years before Bowers. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (i98i). In Atkins, the Court recently did adopt something resembling the
ECHR's approach, by focusing on the legislative trend away from permitting the execution of the
mentally retarded. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2o02) (invalidating state statute permitting the execution of mentally retarded persons). Last term, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court went so
far as to cite the ECHR in overturning the Texas consensual sodomy statute and overruling Bowers in
the process. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (citing Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)).
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government, i.e., government by self-generated principles of justice, is
impossible."'
To get at the roots of the problem of constitutionalizing criminal
law, we must not only widen the traditional approach by including a
comparative perspective. We must deepen it as well. Insofar as we are ultimately concerned with principles of justice, it would be inappropriate to
limit our attention to constitutional law. The specific form of the legal
norms, constitutional or not, that are derived from these principles of justice is of secondary importance.
Still, the constitutional quality of these doctrines remains significant
for two, external, reasons. First, in American jurisprudence, constitutional law marks the realm of principles of justice. Principles of justice
thus must first be translated into principles of constitutional law. Note
that this translation is not required in other legal systems. In Germany,
for instance, criminal theory long preceded constitutional jurisprudence,
and criminal law professors reached consensus on the basic principles of
criminal liability long before judges had any say in the matter-and in
fact long before there was a constitution or a court to interpret it. 85 In the
American system of justice, by contrast, there is no room for "an intermediate body of theory," "a set of principles below the Constitution, but
higher than the rules of positive law.""" For that reason, the constitutionalization of principles of criminal justice is of the utmost importance, in
the United States. There is no firmer ground for a principle of justice than
the Constitution, not the common law, and certainly not professor-made
theory.
Second, the federal constitutional status of a principle implies its application to state law. Considerations of federalism inform the application of principles of justice, but they are secondary to the formulation of
the principles themselves. So from our perspective, the distinction between a constitutional rule and, say, a rule of statutory interpretation- a
common move employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in matters of constitutional criminal law-is irrelevant. What matters, for our purposes, is
84. Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently agrees: "[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded
in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process." Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts--ComparativeRemarks (1989), in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., t993).
85. Still, even in Germany, as the status of the professoriate has declined, more attention is being
paid to the question of how the traditional principles of German criminal law can be grounded in constitutional norms. See generally APPEL, supra note 15. In Germany, the task consists of transforming
professorial principles into constitutional ones; in the United States, it is the old English common law
principles that require constitutional regrounding.
86. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 552 (1978).
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what principle motivates the adoption of the rule. Whether the principle
is such that it should apply interjurisdictionally is another question. We
ask ourselves, in other words, whether, within a given jurisdiction, a principle holds, much as would a state court reviewing a state law, or a fed-

eral court reviewing a federal statute, 87 or, for that matter, a Canadian
court reviewing a Canadian statute.
B.

HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The concept of human dignity is not self-explanatory. As a principle
of constitutional law it is terribly, even terrifyingly, vague.8 Though less
nonsensical than the notion of substantive due process, it is no easier to
make sense of.S9 And yet, vagueness clearly does not imply irrelevance,
or impropriety. For as fuzzy as human dignity might appear at first sight,
as incontrovertible is its resonance in the realm of rights.' Rather than
abandon human dignity as hopelessly empty, we might do better to follow the intuition of its constitutional significance, and to tease out its
meaning instead of dismissing it as meaningless.
The concept of human dignity has in recent years been subjected to
considerable scrutiny in moral and political philosophy, with obvious implications for legal theory, and constitutional law. 9' The revival of theoretical interest in the concept of human dignity roughly coincided with
87. Assuming the Court decides the case not as a matter of statutory interpretation, but as a matter of constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court's most celebrated mens rea case, Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952), was strictly speaking a case about a rule of statutory interpretation (something like "imply mens rea if faced with a malum in se crime without an explicit mens rea
requirement"), not about a constitutional principle ("all malum in se crimes require mens rea"). Cf.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (invalidating criminal gun possession statute as
beyond Congress's power to regulate commerce).
88. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, "Human Dignity," and Constitutional Interpretation,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 14, at 129, 131.
89. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 3 (1997) ("[t]his paradoxical, even oxymoronic phrase").
go. So, for instance, Martha Nussbaum finds at the heart of the liberal tradition of political
thought "a twofold intuition about human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal
dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this
worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one's own evaluation of ends." MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 57 (999);
see also Joel Feinberg, HARM TO OTHERS 9, 211-12 (1987) (arguing human dignity is conditioned on
personal freedom).
95. See, e.g., THOMAS E. HILL JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S MORAL THEORY
(1992); THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNrrY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 14;Michael
J. Meyer, The Simple Dignity of Sentient Life: Speciesism and Human Dignity, 32 J. Soc. PHIL. 115
(2ooI); Sarah Buss, Respect for Persons, 29 CAN. J. PHIL. 517 (1999); Alan Brudner, Guilty Under the
Charter: The Lure of ParliamentarySupremacy, 40 CRIM. L.Q. 287 (1998); Michael J. Meyer, Dignity,
Death and Modern Virtue, 32 AM. PHIL. 0. 45 (1995); Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and SelfControl, 99 ETHICS 520 (1989); Michael J. Meyer, Kant's Concept of Dignity and Modern Political
Thought, 8 HIsT. EUR. IDEAS 319 (1987).
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the renaissance of political and moral philosophy in the early 1970s,
marked by the publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice in 1971i."
Long before theory, however, came practice. The Preamble of the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family [a]s the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world." Article i set out by declaring that "[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights."93 Since then, human
dignity has emerged as a core concept of international human rights law,
and theory.'
A little closer to home, human dignity played a significant justificatory role in the civil rights movement. Martin Luther King's "Letter from
Birmingham Jail," for instance, called for "substantive and positive
peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality" and charted a path "from the quicksand of racial injustice to

[the] solid rock of human dignity."95
While the precise requirements of dignity remain controversial -and
properly so-progress has been made in clarifying the contours of its
meaning and significance. At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between two varieties of dignity, social and moral (or human) dignity, or
dignity of rank and dignity of personhood. Social dignity is determined
by one's position in some hierarchy or another. In fact, one's dignity in
this sense is defined in terms of one's superiority to another. The king
has his dignity, the lord his, and so on down until we reach a point of no
dignity. The line between dignity and no dignity might be drawn at different points, perhaps between the aristocracy and commoners, or between men and women, or between householders and servants. The
92. See, e.g., Michael S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299 (1972); Herbert
Spiegelberg, Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, 9 PHIL. F. (1971); Joel
Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252-53 (1970).
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/81o at 71 (948).
Another postwar declaration of rights, that in the German Basic Law of 1949, likewise assigns priority
to human dignity: "Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and to protect it is the duty of all state authority." GG art. i(i)(F.R.G. Constitution).
94. See, e.g., THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, at vi (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); Chandra Mazaffar, From Human Rights to Human Dignity, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA 25

(Peter Van Ness ed.,

1999); Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights
Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J.INT'L L. 316,
334 (i99); Rhoda E. Howard & Jack Donnelly, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political
Re-

gimes, inUNIVERSAL
McDOUGAL, HAROLD

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

D.

LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU

66 (Jack

CHEN, HUMAN

Donnelly ed., 1989); MYRES S.

RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:

THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (198o).

95. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963); see also Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination, 61 J. PHIL. 628, 638-41 (1964).
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important point is not where the line is drawn, but that it has to be drawn
somewhere. Some people have social dignity, others do not. In fact, if
everyone had social dignity, no one would have it.
Social dignity is not only hierarchical and relative. It is also nonessential; it can be gained and lost, at least in a society that permits social
mobility upward and downward. So I may lose the dignity associated
with a certain status by losing that status, either through my own doing or
through degradation by someone else.
Moral dignity, by contrast, is an essential characteristic of all persons
as such. It is a necessary attribute of individuals who satisfy the minimum
requirements of personhood. Whoever qualifies for personhood enjoys
human dignity for that reason, and that reason alone. 6 In this sense, we
say that someone has a right to dignified treatment, i.e., to our respect.
By contrast, there is no such thing as a right to social dignity. Social dignity is an ethical phenomenon that comes and goes with the evolution of
the norms of a given ethical community.
The connection between human dignity and human rights lies, as
one might suspect, in the concept of humanness, or personhood.97 And to
the extent that law concerns itself with the protection of human rights,
human dignity is of legal significance. Now, there is such a thing as human rights law, which in the United States is thought of as a subcategory
of international law. Constitutional law, by contrast, is said to concern
itself with constitutional rights. Constitutional rights, however, bear an
obvious relation to human rights: Human rights are a subset of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights include human, or moral, rights-the
rights of persons as persons-in addition to political, or ethical, rightsthe rights of persons as citizens, i.e., as members of a given political
community, such as the United States or a state. And so the U.S. Constitution defines rights in terms of persons 8 or citizens' and, more ambiguously, "the people."" °
To say that dignity is an attribute of personhood is not saying much,
of course, for the concept of personhood is no more self-explanatory
than that of dignity. The struggle to make sense of personhood, however,

96. See generally MARY ANNE WARREN, MORAL STATUS: OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER Liv(discussing various notions of personhood).
97. See, e.g., Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF

ING THINGS 90-121 (997)

RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 14, at O.

98. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
99. E.g., id. at amend. XIV (referring to citizens of the United States); id. at art. IV, § 2 (referring
to citizens of each states.).
ioo. E.g., id. at amends. I, II, IV, IX. How the inherent ambiguity of "the people" is resolved may
be of considerable importance, as the controversy over the Second Amendment illustrates.
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is not unfamiliar to American constitutional law. The constitutional law
of abortion, for instance, turns on the Supreme Court's attempt to explain when personhood, and therefore rights, begins. In Roe v. Wade,0 I
the Court adopted a medical, rather than a normative, approach to this
tricky question, with the now familiar, and familiarly troublesome, consequence of medicalizing a question of fundamental constitutional significance.
C.

PERSONS, PUNISHMENT, AND PROPORTIONALITY

It is important to recognize that Roe is (also) a case about constitutional criminal law. Although it was not thought of-by the Court or by
commentators-as a criminal case, Roe raised a number of important
questions of constitutional criminal law.
The specific question in the abortion cases was whether a state was
constitutionally permitted to criminalize certain conduct, namely the
termination of a pregnancy, as an "abortion." Abortion was a serious
crime then, and remains a felony to this day.' From the perspective of
criminal law, the question was whether the Constitution places any limitation upon the state's definition of the crime of abortion or, alternatively, whether it requires the state to recognize certain defenses to the
crime of abortion, however defined.
The Court, in effect, decided that the federal Constitution-and the
right to privacy in particular-required the states to provide for certain
"justifications" in criminal abortion cases, so that the termination of the
pregnancy in those cases was "justifiable," i.e., lawful or at least not
wrongful (as opposed to wrongful, but excusable). Among the conditions
for this constitutional justification were the necessity to preserve the
woman's life, in which case the woman's right to life outweighed that of
the fetus," 3 and, for our purposes most significant, the viability of the fetus.'" (For present purposes, it matters little whether the states codified
this justification by limiting the definition of abortion to "unjustified

1oI. 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (I973).
102. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.40, "45 (McKinney 1998) (designating abortion as a class D felony).
103. In fact, the justification of necessity (or "balance of evils") was first recognized in German
criminal law in just such a case. Judgment of Mar. 11,1927, RGSt 61, 242 (regarding risk of suicide); cf.
MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 194-202 (2002).
104. See,

e.g., N.Y.

PENAL LAW

§ 125.05(3)

("An abortional

act is justifiable

when ...

(a) ...necessary to preserve [the pregnant female's] life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the
commencement of her pregnancy.").
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abortion,"' 5 by allowing for a defense of justification separate from the
definition of the offense, or by doing something in between."")
It is also worth noting that this is not the only question of constitutional criminal law raised by the abortion cases. For the state is not only
obligated to protect the rights of persons against itself, but also against
other persons."° In Roe, the Court decided that the fetus did not achieve
personhood until viability and therefore could not be protected by means
of the criminal law (though the state might be free to discourage earlyterm abortions by other, non-criminal, means). In German constitutional
law, in fact, the issue of the criminal protection of personal rights in the
case of abortion was framed more starkly; there the question was
whether the state is constitutionally prohibited, not from punishing certain abortions, but from not punishing them, or put more generally,
whether the state can ever be obligated to punish certain conduct."°
In fact, the general obligation to protect persons' "lives, liberties,
and property" against interpersonal violation justifies the state's exercise
of the right to punish, and to prevent, in the first place. Criminal law, at
bottom, is simply one way in which the state discharges its most basic obligation, to guarantee the rights of its constituents as persons. In the familiar words of Thomas Jefferson:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these, are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men .... '0'

Criminal law protects the rights of persons against a particular type
of interference, namely by other persons, as opposed to, say, the forces of
nature, wild animals, or foreign nations. As Jefferson explained in the
preamble to his 1778 draft criminal code for his state of Virginia:
[I]t frequently happens that wicked and dissolute men resigning themselves to the dominion of inordinate passions, commit violations on the
lives, liberties and property of others, and, the secure enjoyment of
these having principally induced men to enter into society, government
would be defective in it's [sic] principalpurpose were it not to restrain
105. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(0) (1985).

io6. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40 ("A person is guilty of abortion... when he commits an abor-

tional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to... section 125.05.")
107. Cf. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] S.C.R. 330, 335 (Can.) (L'Heureux-Dube, J., concurring) (stating
sexual assault is "an offence against human dignity and a violation of human rights" protected by the
Canadian charter).
lo8. BVerfGE 39, 1(975); BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993). An extended discussion of the American and
German abortion cases from a constitutional, rather than a criminal, perspective appears in VICKI C.
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-143 (1999).
1O9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 55:509

such criminal acts, by inflicting due punishments on those who perpetrate them .... ."'

Concerned with the protection of persons against interpersonal violence -understood

broadly as the violation of personal rights-the

criminal law faces a particular paradox and an inherent limitation. In
protecting one person's right, it must not disregard the right of another.
To put it differently, not only the victim has rights as a person, so does
the offender."' And so Jefferson's preamble continues:
[B]ut it appears at the same time equally deducible from the purposes
of society that a member thereof, committing an inferior injury, does
not wholly forfeit the protection of his fellow citizens, but, after suffering a punishment in proportionto his offence is entitled to their protection from all greater pain, so that it becomes a duty in the legislature to

arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may be necessary for
them to repress, and to adjust thereto a corresponding gradation of
punishments. " '

In other words, the very nature of "governments" as guarantors of
rights both grounds, and constrains, the state's power to punish. And
more specifically, it imposes upon the state a general requirement of
proportionalityof crime and punishment. Just what this principle of proportionality consists of-never mind what it requires in particular
cases-is not self-evident, and has remained highly controversial to this
day. The U.S. Supreme Court, for one, has continued to struggle to put
meat on the bones of what is now a constitutionalrequirement of proportionality said to derive from the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
"cruel and unusual punishments."
Any exploration of the specific requirements of proportionality,
however, must proceed from the recognition that proportionality is not
an incidental feature of the law of sentencing, but a fundamental principle of justice that emanates directly from the state's essential duty to protect the personal right of its constituents. In Jefferson's words, the
principle of proportionate punishment is a basic right that is retained
even by those "wicked and dissolute men" who commit crimes, "deducible from the purposes of society," i.e., to secure their, and not only their
victims', "unalienable Rights, [including] Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."
The question of course is what has to be proportional to what. Jefferson's own view of proportionality oddly combined strict adherence to

i O. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for ProportioningCrimes and Punishments, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, at 90, 9o-9i (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943) (1779).
iii. See generally DUBBER, supra note 3.
i
112. Jefferson, supra note ito, at 9 .
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the lex talionis and a Beccarian interest in balancing the anticipated pains
of punishment against the anticipated pleasures of crime. In his view,
proportionality did not stand in the way of, and indeed called for, corporal punishment, including "cutting out or disabling the tongue, slitting or
cutting off a nose" in-proportionate-retaliation for having done the
same to another person, the victim." 3
Jefferson's proportionate mutilation was merely a crude version of
the elaborate taxonomy of proportionate pain developed by another follower of Beccaria's utilitarian theory of punishment as deterrence, Jeremy Bentham. Bentham distinguished between various sources of
proportionality, including "The same Instrument used in the Crime as in
the Punishment," "For a Corporal Injury a similar Corporal Injury,"
"Punishment of the Offending Member," and "Imposition of Disguise
assumed." Arson should be punished by proportionate, and analogous,
burning, carefully calibrated to the offender's act:
It would be necessary carefully to determine the text of the law, the
part of the body which ought to be exposed to the action of the fire; the
intensity of the fire; the time during which it is to be applied, and the
paraphernalia to be employed to increase the terror of the punishment." 4
Forgery likewise was to be punished by stabbing the offender with
the tool of his trade: "[T]he hand of the offender may be transfixed by an
iron instrument fashioned like a pen, and in this condition he may be exhibited to the public previously to undergoing the punishment of imprisonment."" 5
Instead of regarding proportionality as a way to maximize deterrence, the Canadian Supreme Court recently has recognized a constitutional principle of "proportionality between blameworthiness and6
punishment," derived from the "fundamental value" of human dignity."
Thus broadly construed and connected to the similarly broad notion of
blameworthiness, proportionality can accommodate a wide range of
more specific principles, most notably those that guarantee some, any,
kind of blameworthiness in the first place, such as actus reus, mens rea,
and the excuses (like duress, provocation, and insanity).
In German constitutional law, proportionality in a different sensethe means-ends relationship between the state's action and the interest,
or right, it is meant to further, or protect-has been invoked in support
113. See id. at 96.
114. JEREMY BENTHAM,THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 56-62 (London,

C. & W. Reynel 1830).

115. Id.

1 I6. Alan Brudner, Guilty Under the Charter: The Lure of ParliamentarySupremacy, 40 CRIM.
L.Q. 287, 324 (1998).
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of the so-called ultima ratio principle. This principle authorizes the state
to employ the criminal law only as a last resort, if no less intrusive alternatives are available." 7
Citing the usual federalist constraints, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken a far narrower view of the constitutional requirement of proportionality. There is even support among members of the Court, led by Justice Scalia, for the proposition that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause in the Eighth Amendment implies no F roportionality requirement
of any kind, at least not in noncapital cases." (Even in capital cases, this
faction only grudgingly allows for constitutional proportionality, largely
on grounds of stare decisis."9 )

It is important to recognize that the very attempt to define a requirement of proportionality reflects a particular approach to the criminal law. As long as the criminal law is perceived as an exercise of the
royal prerogative to punish or not to punish, or rather to "amerce" or not
to "amerce," it would be difficult to impose any constraints on its use.' 0
The king was offended, and it was up to the king to decide whether, and
if so how, and how harshly, to respond. The prohibition of "greatly disproportionate" or "malicious" punishment in English law appears to
have originated precisely as an attempt to limit, and to legalize, the king's
unconstrained power of amercement.'' The recognition of some proportionality requirement still does not settle the question of what should be
proportionate to what (after all, the requirement might demand that the
king's amercement be proportional to the offense taken), but it at least
marks the beginning of a transition from a preconstitutional to a constitutional system of criminal law.
D.

AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY

Now, regardless of which criminal issue Roe raised-may the state
punish, or must it?-from the perspective of constitutionallaw the question before the Supreme Court was whether viability is a necessary con117. ROXIN, supra note 70, at 26-27. For a discussion of this idea in the Anglo-American context,
see Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming
2004).

118. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (i99i) (Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J.). Everyone acknowledges that the "excessive fines" clause does demand proportionality. According to Justice Scalia,
then, a one cent fine is subject to proportionality analysis, but a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole is not.
I 19. Id. at 993-94.
120. E.g., 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, at 513 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1923) (1898) (regarding amercements

in English law).
121. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The OriginalMeaning,
57 CAL. L. REV. 839,846-47 (1969).
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dition of personhood, in which case the previable fetus would not qualify
as a rights bearer (and thus have no right to criminal protection).
Whether viability is also a sufficient condition is another matter altogether. For the concept of personhood, and the right to dignity emanating from it, has traditionally been associated with the capacity for selfdetermination, or autonomy.122 There can be little doubt that there are
human beings who lack that capacity, understood broadly as the ability
to identify and apply relevant norms and act according to them. The capacity for autonomy presupposes certain basic intellectual capacities,
cognitive as well as volitional, that certain individuals have not yet developed, will never develop, or have lost for one reason or another.
In this context, actual autonomy should be distinguished from the
capacity for autonomy, or what John Finnis has dubbed radical autonomy.'23 It is the latter that makes a person. While a person may be more
or less autonomous in fact, depending on such particular characteristics
as age, race, gender, health, wealth, social status, place of residence, or
for that matter state of consciousness, all persons share the capacity for
autonomy. There are of course differences in the capacity for autonomy
as well. Even children-and viable fetuses-have the basic prerequisites
for developing a full capacity, and it is for that reason that they can claim
certain rights, even if only through the mediation of a person with a fully
developed capacity for autonomy.'24
Individuals who, regardless of age, entirely lack the capacity for
autonomy, either temporarily or permanently, raise a difficult question.
In criminal law, that question is handled through the defense of insanity,
if it is the putative offender who is incapacitated in this fundamental
way.'25 In the case of an incapacitated victim, the criminal law draws no
distinctions on the basis of capacity, even though the totally incapacitated victim cannot be said to have suffered interference with her "unalienable Rights." If anything, the person who stands convicted of
122. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, supra note 90, at 57.

123. John Finnis, The Priority of Persons, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES I,
15 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
124. Id. ("A day-old baby has-radically,albeit not yet in actually usable form-this capacity to
choose (with such self-determining, intransitive effects)."); see also BVerfGE 39, I, 41 (1975) ("Where
human life exists it merits human dignity; it is not decisive whether the holder of this human'dignity
knows of it and is able to maintain it by himself. The potential capabilities lying in human existence
from its inception on are sufficient to justify human dignity.").
125. As this Article explores in greater detail below, the defense of insanity thus implicates human
dignity in two, conflicting, ways. On the one hand, to permit punishment of those who lack the capacity for autonomy implies the irrelevance of that capacity in general and thus transforms punishment
into a practice without regard to the personhood of its object. On the other, an expansive insanity defense might violate the right to dignity of those who "benefit" from it, by moving them beyond the
realm of personhood. See infra text accompanying notes 192-94.
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committing a violation against an incapacitated victim is likely to face
harsherpunishment, rather than no punishment at all.2 6
It may be, of course, that legal protections -including those in the
form of the criminal law-are extended to those who lack even the capacity for autonomy not as a matter of right, but as a matter of mercy.
Then again, perhaps they reflect a consensus that all humans share at
least the radical capacity for autonomy, no matter what medical science
might tell us, so that even the most severely incapacitated individual retains the chance or at least the hope, however small, of gaining, or regaining, her autonomy. In that case, her entitlement to rights and to
human dignity still would derive from her capacity for autonomy, however remote.'27
The idea of autonomy as the foundation of personhood, and therefore of human dignity, is ordinarily associated with Kant. 28 Clearly, Kant
presented the most elaborate account of autonomy and the dignity to
which it gives rise. Just as clearly, however, Kant was not alone in stressing the connection between human-as opposed to social-dignity and
human rights. To begin with, Kant himself acknowledged that he took
the notion of the dignity of the person from Rousseau:
I feel the whole thirst for knowledge and the curious unrest to get further on, or also the satisfaction in every acquisition. There was a time
when I believed that this alone could make the honor of humanity and
I despised the rabble that knows nothing. Rousseau set me to rights.
This dazzling superiority vanishes, I learn to honor man .... "'
Also from Rousseau stems Kant's view that the origin of human dignity, and respect for persons as such, lay simply in the general capacity
for self-determination shared by all persons, no matter what their social
status or even, in Kant's words, their "thirst for knowledge.' 3.

126. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3AI.I (2002) (regarding vulnerable victim enhancement).
127. For a careful examination of duties toward humans in a persistent vegetative state, see Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Death and Modern Virtue, 32 AM. PHIL. Q. 45 (1995); Michael J. Meyer, The
Simple Dignity of Sentient Life: Speciesism and Human Dignity, 32 J. Soc. PHIL. 115, 119-21 (2ooi).
128. Kant was very clear on this point: "Autonomy is...
the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 43
(4:436) (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). For discussion, see JOHN RAWLS,
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 209-1I (20oo); A.I. Melden, Dignity, Worthy, and
Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 14, at 29,
33.
129. J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
489 (1998) (quoting Kant).
130. See Michael J. Meyer, Kant's Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought, in 8 HIST. OF
EUR. IDEAS 319, 327 (1987).
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Further, the connection between dignity and personhood, and between personhood and autonomy, was a central feature of political discourse in the late eighteenth century, the time of Kant and of the
American Founding Fathers. As Michael Meyer has shown, a common
response to Edmund Burke's withering critique of the French Revolution ' ' was to assert the universal concept of human dignity against
Burke's exclusive notion of social dignity as the proper foundation of legitimate government.'32 In 1776, the Welsh political philosopher Richard
Price noted that "according to the[] definitions of the different kinds of
liberty, there is one general idea, that runs through them all; I mean, the
idea of Self-direction, or Self-government,' '33 and James Madison celebrated "the capacity of mankind for self-government" some years later in
the Federalist Papers.'34 In sum, Meyer concludes,
[t]he general Enlightenment vision of human dignity.., is tied inextricably to the human capacity and inclination for self-government. To
make this assertion is not to advance the questionable notion that the
Framers were Kantians. It is, rather, to say that the tenor of much
Enlightenment moral, political, and legal thought clearly leads in the
direction of the equal recognition of individual human dignity, and it
does so because of a belief in the citizenry's capacity for selfgovernment and a commitment to their equal right to the same.'35
Some two hundred years after Madison, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 3 6 reemphasized the connection between
personal dignity, autonomy, and personhood, and recognized the place of
dignity thus understood at the center of its constitutional jurisprudence
of the right to liberty:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child." Our precedents "have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." These mat-

131.

EDMUND

BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

(Charles Posner ed., Penguin

Books 197o) (1790).
132. See Meyer, supra note 13o, at 319, 327 (discussing THOMAS PAINE, RIGtrrS OF MAN (1791) and
A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (I79o)).

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT,

133.

RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF GoVERN-

MENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA 2-4

(London, T. Cadell 1776).

134. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison).

135. Michael J. Meyer, Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERIsupra note 14, at 7. For a discussion of the similarities between Adam Smith's and
Kant's views on interpersonal respect and "the dignity of individuals," see Stephen Darwall, Sympathetic Liberalism:Recent Work on Adam Smith, 28 PHIL. &PUB. AFFAIRS 139, 144-45 (1999).
CAN VALUES I,

136. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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ters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.'37

Note that Casey was a constitutional criminal law case; as in Roe,
and any of the other "substantive due process" cases, the Court reviewed
the constitutionality of a criminal statute. In Roe and Casey, the statutes
in question criminalized abortions; in Poe v. Ullman' and in Griswold v.
Connecticut, the crime was using "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception,' ' 39 in Eisenstadt v. Baird,
it was "to give away a drug, medicine, instrument, or article for the prevention of conception,,' 4 and in last term's Lawrence v. Texas it was
"sodomy.'' And as in Roe (and in Griswold and Eisenstadt before it,
and in Lawrence after it' 42), the Court in Casey invalidated parts of the
criminal statute under review (in particular, the spousal notification requirement as an element of justification, criminally speaking). Casey thus
demonstrated that constitutional criminal law review can have teeth.
And Casey confirmed more specifically that the concept of human dignity as a principle of constitutional criminal law can have real bite.
The centrality of the concept of personal dignity through autonomy
became particularly clear in another constitutional criminal law case decided a few years after Casey, Washington v. Glucksberg.'43 Glucksberg

addressed a due process challenge against a state statute making it a
crime to "knowingly cause[] or aid[] another person to attempt sui-

137. Id. at 851 (citations omitted) (second emphasis added); cf. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 52 (980) "the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being"); cf. Alan Brudner,
Guilty Under the Charter: The Lure of ParliamentarySupremacy, 40 CRIM. L.Q. 287, 293 (1998) (According to the Canadian Supreme Court, "the values underlying the.., right to life, liberty, and security of the person are ... the autonomy and equal dignity of persons.... .
138. 367 U.S. 497,499 n.2 (i961).
139. 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). Poe and Griswold were about the same crimes, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958).
140. 405 U.S. 438,44o-41 (I972).
141. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2476 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
142. I am not counting Poe because the Court did not decide on the merits of the constitutional
attack. Justice Harlan's famous dissent, however, made a powerful case for the statute's unconstitutionality, had the Court decided to decide the issue, as it did four years later in Griswold. For an engaging discussion of Justice Harlan's Poe dissent in the context of constitutional criminal law, see
Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335, 369 (2000) (arguing
"the Harlan conception of liberty captures a prevalent and compelling intuition, namely that human
beings have a generalized right to liberty").

143. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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cide."'" The Court rejected the challenge. More important for our purposes, however, is that the entire case was framed in terms of human
dignity, with the challengers explicitly, and persistently, invoking a right
to "death with dignity.' I45 Further, the case was resolved in terms of human dignity. The decisive question was not whether human dignity was
at stake, or whether human dignity deserves protection by the state
through law, but whether human dignity could only be preserved by the
invalidation of the criminal statute under review. The Court decided that
no such constitutional interference was required, since the concededly
central right of human dignity was sufficiently protected by the political
process: "Public concern and democratic action are.., sharply focused
on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of life, with
the result that there have been many
significant changes in state laws and
4
in the attitudes these laws reflect. 0
One may of course disagree with the Court's conclusion here, as
many constitutional commentators have.' 47 The point remains, however,
that the Court recognized personal dignity through autonomy as central
to the right to liberty.
When Chief Justice Warren identified "the dignity of man" as "the
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment,"' 48 and when Justice
Brennan referred to the Constitution in its entirety as "a charter of human rights, dignity and self-determination,"' 149 they therefore fell squarely
within a long and well-established tradition of American thought, and of
modern political thought more generally. Within this framework, the
task of American constitutional law-what Charles Black liked to call
"the human-rights law of the United States"l-is to work out the implications of this fundamental principle of human dignity characteristic of
all persons as capable of self-government, or autonomy.

144. Id.
145. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity, A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 691 (i99i); Jeremy A. Sitcoff, Death With Dignity, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 677 (1996);
see generally Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Death and Modern Virtue, 32 AM. PHIL. Q. 45 (I995) (analyzing "death with dignity" rhetoric).
146. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716 (emphasis added).
147. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
Sept. 25, 1997, at 40.
148. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (20o2) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, Ioo-oi

(1958)).
149. Brennan, supra note t.
150. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED I
(i997).
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
This task is particularly important, and particularly difficult, in the
case of the constitutional law of crime and punishment. For it is here that
the temptation to violate human dignity, ironically in the rush to protect
it, is particularly great. The reflex of responding to the violation of one
person's right to autonomy through an equal and opposite violation of
the offender's right is as powerful as it is familiar. Through the criminal
law the state responds to the most potent threats to the rights of those
whose rights it exists to protect. At the same time, the criminal law consists of the state's most potent, and most potentially intrusive, means of
interfering with those very rights. The central concept of human dignity
is at stake both in crime and in punishment. The constitutional law of
crime and punishment thus faces the most difficult challenge of any
branch of constitutional law.
A.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT RECONCEIVED

One way of understanding the challenge of constitutional criminal
law in light of the concept of human dignity is to consider the implications of punishment for the social dignity of the punished.' A constitutional criminal law committed to maintaining the human dignity of all
persons as such, including those convicted of a crime, would face the difficult task of differentiating social indignity from human indignity. However socially degrading punitive labeling may be, constitutional criminal
law would be charged with ensuring that it not impugn the offender's
personal dignity. Ideally, of course, constitutional criminal law would
prevent violations of human dignity altogether by precluding interference even with dignity in the social sense. If this should prove impossible,
however, constitutional criminal law must at the very least set minimum
standards of stigmatization consistent with the offender's dignity as a
person.
As a factual matter, punishment deals a blow to the social dignity of
its object. More troubling, punishment is regarded by many as designed
to have that very effect, to a greater or smaller extent. Punishment is said
to imply a stigma, which lowers the recipient's standing in "the" commu"' Under this view,
nity. 52
punishment has a deterrent effect insofar as potential offenders wish to avoid its socially degrading effect.

151. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003) (remarking that even as a misdemeanor, homosexual sodomy "remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the
persons charged").
152. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.O6(2)(b) cmut. 4 (1985).
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In this regard punishment resembles what Harold Garfinkel has described as a degradation ceremony.'53 Note, however, that it is not only
punishment that degrades. It is the ascription of the label "offender" that
degrades, with the degree of degradation depending not only (obviously)
on the nature of the offense and of the offender, but also (less obviously)
on the likelihood that the label has been accurately applied; the level of
degradation thus increases as the suspect becomes a defendant becomes
a convict becomes an inmate. Also, as Garfinkel observed, the term degradation may be misleading in that it implies a lowering of status. In fact,
the ascription of criminal wrongdoing amounts to recognizing the offender's status, rather than reducing it. This is so because the offender is
thought of as having revealed himself as lacking social dignity, and is
therefore deserving of little or even no respect. The ascription of wrongdoing then simply reflects the offender's having revealed himself to be of
low status. The offense reflects the offender's low status, and in turn is
reflected in the ascription of the offender label.
This degradation process may not be pretty, but it is not necessarily
illegitimate, as long as the offender's status at stake is social, rather than
moral, so that his human dignity remains intact no matter how little social dignity he retains-or rather turns out to have possessed in the first
place. Here it might be helpful to think of social dignity in terms of
honor, and crime not only as undignified, but as dishonorable. 4 The notion of crime as dishonorable has a long history in Anglo-American
criminal law, where the distinction between social and legal meanness
was often fluid. Felony, for instance-and perhaps even murder-was at
its historical root a violation of the vassal's duty of loyalty to his lord.'55 A
felony revealed a "meanness" of character, a malice, that called for degrading punishment, in Garfinkel's sense of recognition of low status.
Pollock and Maitland tell us that in the old common law, "[flelon is as
bad a word as you can give to man or thing[!], and it will stand equally
well for many kinds of badness, for ferocity, cowardice, craft."'' 6

153. Howard Garfinkel, Conditionsof Successful Degradation Ceremonies,61 AM. J. Soc. 420,421(1956).
154. Some crimes, such as murder, incest, cannibalism, and child abuse, in fact, are still thought to
"disqualify a person from holding any position of honor." Gary Wills, The Bishops at Bay, N.Y. REV.
BooKs, Aug. 15, 2002, at 8-1i (quoting Francis DiLorenzo at semiannual meeting of U.S. Catholic
Bishops, Dallas, June 13-15, 2002).
155. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 120, at 303-04. On the origins of murder, see BRUCE R.
O'BRIEN, GOD'S PEACE AND KING'S PEACE: THE LAWS OF EDWARD THE CONFESSOR 79 (1999); BRUCE R.
O'BRIEN, From Mor6or to Murdrum: The PreconquestOrigin and Norman Revival of the Murder Fine,
71 SPECULUM 321 (1996).
156. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 120, at 2.
23
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Historically, criminal punishment more closely resembled degradation in the strict sense of reduction in the offender's status, when the offender had a status to lose. The most dramatic instance of such a fall
from social status, and the concomitant loss of social dignity, came in the
form of the traditional limitation upon the householder's authority to
discipline members of his household, including wife, children, and servants. While that authority originally was almost boundless, it was always
understood that a householder who disciplined not in the exercise of his
householderly duty to maintain the welfare of the household, but due to
a "malignant heart," malice, or sadism,'57 if in short a householder proved
himself unworthy of his elevated status, he would be stripped of his authority and would 8himself be reduced to (and by) punishment, at the
hands of the state.:
In these dramatic-and rare-cases, where the householder would
be transformed from a subject of punishment to its object, the householder was forced to acknowledge the superior dignity of the state. The
state's punishment of the householder reminded him that he was but a
member of the macro household of the state, and as such enjoyed disciplinary power over "his" household only by delegation from the state,
which claimed a monopoly on violence. As the householder's dignity
might justify the discipline of disobedient or disloyal subordinates, so the
state's dignity justified the punishment of each and every one, householder or not, who committed "an offense against its peace and dignity."'59 In doing so, the state is doing nothing more than "exercising it[s]
own sovereignty, "' or, in other words, its police power, that power of
governance generally recognized in American law as the foundation of
criminal law.'
The notion of crime as an affront to the sovereign's dignity has deep
roots in Anglo-American law. From time immemorial, every householder enjoyed extensive authority to protect the "peace" of his house157. State v. Black, 6o N.C. 262, 264 (1864); United States v. Clark, 31 F. 710 (E.D. Mich. 1887);
see also Commonwealth v. Eckert, 2 Browne 249 (Ct. of Quarter Sessions Pa. 1812) (holding malice
evidence of "a depraved or wicked heart"); I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW 531 (8th ed., T.H. Flood 1892) (1865). See generally Beirne Stedman, Right of Husband
to Chastise Wife, 3 VA. L. REG. 241, 244 (1917).

158. Even in less extreme cases, the householder might not lose his authority altogether, but still
might see his honor compromised in the eyes of his peers, or at very least in his own eyes, i.e., his conscience. Cf. Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,61 J. PHIL. 628

(1964) (discussing constraints on Southern slaveholders' treatment of their slaves).
159. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,
382 (1922)) (emphasis added).
i6o. Id.
161. See, e.g., I LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 80, § 2.9. See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE
POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 2004).
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hold. "The sheriff has his peace, the lord of a soken has his peace; nay,
every householder has his peace; you break his peace if you fight in his
house, and, besides all the other payments that you must make to atone
you must make a payment to him for the
for your deed of violence,
6
2
breach of his mund."
Disciplinary authority over household members was one aspect of
that authority. Violations of the householder's peace were, in the end,
affronts to his authority, his social dignity qua householder. The origins
of English criminal law, as a state-centered system of punishment, lay in
the expansion of the king's "peace" to cover the entire realm. The expansion of royal power thus was the expansion of the king's power as
householder over his royal household, which included everyone, and
including those freemen who claimed
everything, within his realm,
63
households of their own.
The police power is the modem manifestation of the power of the
king/householder over his realm/household. As Blackstone explained,
the king, as the "father" of his people, 6 ' and "pater-familias of the nation," 165 was charged with
the public police and economy[, i.e.,] the due regulation and domestic
order of the kingdom: whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and good
manners: and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations.' 66
It is this very same police power that today grounds the power to
punish in American constitutional law:
A state... may declare activities to be criminal without the necessity
of finding some express or implied authority therefor in its constitution. It is commonly said that a state has regulatory power (usually
termed its "police power") to regulate its internal affairs for the protection or promotion of public health, safety and morals, orsomewhat more vaguely-for the protection or promotion of the public welfare.'67
And just as in English law crimes-as breaches of the king's peace
constituted an affront to the king's dignity-so today crimes as breaches

162.

I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12o, at 2.

163. Id. at 1; see also O'BRIEN, supra note 155, at 348; S.F.C. MILsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW 427 (2d ed. 1981) ("[A]nything done against the king's command was done against

his peace....").
164. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162.
165. Id. at *127.
166. Id. at * 162.
67. I LAFAVE & ScorT, supra note 8o, § 2.9.
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of the state's peace constitute an affront to the dignity of the state. A
crime, in short, is an "offense against the peace and dignity" of the state
as sovereign.
In fact, it is this specifically offensive quality that is often said to distinguish a crime from another, legal or moral, wrong. A crime does not
become a crime unless it violates the "peace and dignity" of the state.
This is obviously true of so-called malum prohibitum crimes-also
known as "public welfare offenses" or "police offenses"-which are
crimes only because they violated a state prohibition, rather than because they violated a personal right (malum in se). But it is also true of
crimes that do inflict serious injury on persons, rather than merely manifesting disobedience of a state issued norm fortified by criminal sanctions
(like driving on the right side of the road). According to this view, a
crime without an affront to the dignity of the state is not a crime, but a
tort. Even murder, generally considered the most serious, and most
paradigmatic, of crimes, does not become a crime unless it also constitutes an offense against the peace and dignity of the state. As an illustration, consider the indictment in a well-known constitutional criminal law
case on the so-called "dual sovereignty" exception to the double jeopardy prohibition, Heath v. Alabama:
Larry Gene Heath did intentionally cause the death of Rebecca Heath,
by shooting her with a gun, and Larry Gene Heath caused said death
during Larry Gene Heath's abduction of, or attempt to abduct, Rebecca Heath with intent to inflict physical injury upon her, in violation
of § 13A-5-40(a)(I) of the Code of Alabama 1 975, as amended, against
thepeace and dignity of the State of Alabama.
The notion of crime as state contempt, i.e., as an act of disrespect toward
the state, was central to the decision in Heath, as it is to the doctrine of
double jeopardy as a whole, including its dual sovereignty exception.
Heath was convicted of murder not once, but twice, first in Georgia and
then in Alabama. (He had hired two men to kill his wife; unfortunately
for him, they kidnapped her in Alabama and then killed her across the
border in Georgia. This was enough to establish jurisdiction in both
states, according to the traditional law of criminal jurisdiction, which
concerns itself exclusively with the locus criminis.)
Although there was only a single act of murder, Heath was twice
punishable for that one act, on its face a straightforward violation of the
double jeopardy clause which provides that no "person [shall] be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." (Heath
actually saw both his life and his limb put in jeopardy-he was sentenced

168. 474 U.S. 82,85 n.2 (1985) (emphasis added).
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to death in Alabama after having been sentenced to life imprisonment in
Georgia after pleading guilty.) For that one act amounted to two offenses, "against each sovereign whose laws are violated by that act." In
other words, it offended both the state of Georgia and the state of Alabama by being "against the peace and dignity" of each. And so it fell under the dual sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy principle, for
"each government in determining what shall be an offense against its
peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty." '69 Note, in fact, that
the dual sovereignty exception is not really an exception. The reason why
Heath, and others like him, can-but need not-be punished by Georgia
and Alabama is that his one act constituted two offenses (one against
each state), literally speaking, and there is no prohibition against punishing someone twice for two offenses, only against punishing him twice for
one and the same offense.
Note also that the nature of crime as an offense against the dignity of
the sovereign implies discretion on the sovereign's part regarding howand even if-to respond to the affront. Much as it traditionally was up to
the householder to decide just how to maintain respect for his dignity
among his subordinates, and much as judges still enjoy considerable discretion in deciding how to deal with "contumacious" or "insolent" conduct in their courtroom'7" or other forms of disrespect (say, by violating
one of their orders) through a summary conviction for criminal contempt
as an "immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court,".'7 I so the
state too is free to decide how to best respond to criminal offenses, as the
virtually unfettered charging discretion of prosecutors in American
criminal law makes clear.'72
This view of criminal law, where even murder is regarded as "'contempt' to the king for depriving him of a subject,"''73 is fundamentally at
odds with a constitutional regime dedicated to the protection of human
dignity. It is a view that conceives of the criminal law power as an instance of unconstrained sovereignty preserving its own dignity whenever
and however it deems appropriate. It knows nothing of the obligation of
the state to invoke the law, and the criminal law in particular, to safeguard human dignity, either as a reason for punishing, or as a reason for
punishing less, or in a particular way.

169. Id. at 89 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 26o U.S. 377,382 (1922)).
170. See, e.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW ART. 19 § 75oA.
171. United States v. Abascal, 5o9 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1975).
172. In civil law countries, by contrast, state law enforcement officials, including the prosecution
and the police, are subject to a general principle of compulsory prosecution. See, e.g., § 152 StPO
(F.R.G.).
173. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6oI (3d ed. 199o).
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OFFENDERS' RIGHTS

The task of constitutional criminal law thus consists of nothing less
than replacing this preconstitutional, state-centered, and deeply hierarchical system of criminal law with a person-centered egalitarian one
committed to the protection of human dignity.'74 Most immediately, a
commitment to human dignity means developing constitutional constraints that prevent the criminal law from interfering with minimum protections of the human dignity of offenders, suspected or convicted. More
specifically, it means making a concerted effort to devise a law of crime
and punishment that prevents the regrettable, though perhaps inevitable,
social degradation that accompanies the criminal process from compromising the offender's basic human dignity, thus threatening the offender's status as a person, rather than merely as a member of some
social group.
i.
General Principlesof Liability (The General Part)
In the so-called general part of criminal law, which is concerned with
the general principles of criminal liability,'75 the commitment to preserving the human dignity of the offender while punishing her assault on the
human dignity of the victim has motivated, most importantly, persistent
calls for the recognition of a constitutional principle of culpability, or
blameworthiness, and more narrowly of a requirement of mens rea for all
crimes-or at least all "true" crimes.7 In a constitutional regime of
criminal law, mens rea would no longer appear as a mark of inferior social dignity, of meanness, but as the manifestation of the offender's capacity for autonomy, which marks her as a person, and therefore as
entitled to respect for his human dignity. Mens rea does not make a
crime a crime because it reflects the offender's social meanness, but because it reflects the offender's capacity for self-determination, the hallmark of her personhood,
even in the commission of a crime against
77
another person.

174. Cf Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW 65, 77 (1987) (finding "commitment to democratic values, to human dignity and selfdetermination, to the value of the individual" underlies criminal law).
175. On the distinction between the general part and special part of criminal law, see, for example,
DUBBER, supra note 103, at 14-23 (2002). See also Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part,4 BUFF. CRiM.
L. REv. 301 (2000).
176. The locus classicus is Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &CONTEMP.
PROBS. 405 0958).
177. Cf Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [5985] S.C.R. 486, 512-13

(finding constitutional requirement of mens rea for "true crimes" derived from "belief in the dignity
and worth of the human person").
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Likewise, in constitutional criminal law the actus reus requirement
no longer rests on shaky evidentiary ground, as a symptom of mens rea'?
It instead stands on its own two feet, deriving its strength from the commitment to respecting human dignity, which in this case means refraining
from punishing mens rea-understood in its traditional sense of meanness, or contemptus-for its own sake.'79 The act is not merely an outward
manifestation of low status. It is instead the manifestation of a person's
exercise of her capacity for autonomy. Act in this sense is a uniquely human event, as the exercise of the uniquely human capacity of selfdetermination. Doctrinally speaking, constitutional criminal law cannot
extend to "involuntary acts" (in fact, "involuntary act" becomes an oxymoron),"8 nor to nonhuman acts (another oxymoron), including "corporate" or "group" criminality. 18 ' Likewise, membership in a communal
entity, like a corporation, by itself could not result in attributing criminal
liability to any of its members, as every person could be held criminally
responsible only for her own act, as an expression of his personhood. At
the same time, membership in a communal entity also does not insulate
any of its members from criminal liability either. Each person is criminally responsible for only and all of her own acts.
To punish someone for a status, rather than act, is to treat her as less
than a person. It is to treat her as a thing, a nonhuman animal, or a natural phenomenon, each of which is incapable of acting in the sense of voluntary behavior. Only in the case of a person is there a sharp line
between status and act, between being and doing, as only the person can
choose to act independently of-and inconsistently with-her status. A
"felon," for instance, may decide to refrain from criminal activity, just as
a "vagrant" may decide to settle down.s2 To the extent that a person is
incapable of acting against her status (as, for instance, a drug addict), she
is incapable of exercising her capacity for autonomy, and for that reason
is not punishable as a person.

178. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 164, at *21 ("In all temporal jurisdictions an overt act or
some open evidence of an intended crime, is necessary, in order to demonstrate the depravity of the
will ... ").
179. On the notion of contemptus in early canon law as a precursor to mens rea, see HAROLD J.
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 191

(1983).

18o. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666-68 (1962).
i8i. No statutory definition, no matter how explicit, can bestow the status of personhood upon an
entity other than a human individual. Contra N.Y. PENAL LAW § o.OO(7) (1998) ("'Person' means a
human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a
partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.").
182. Vagrancy statutes thus are unconstitutional not because they are vague, see Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), but because they punish status. See Pottinger v. City of
Miami, 8io F. Supp. 1551, 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
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At the same time, punishing someone for mere nonactualized
thought is not constitutionally impermissible because it would mistreat
her as a nonperson, for nothing is more human, and personal, than
thought. Trees may fall and dogs may bite, but they do not hatch murderous schemes. It is not enough simply to say that a nonactualized
thought may not be punished because the absence of an act indicates insufficient commitment to that thought. For it is not an evidentiary deficit
that bars punishing thought, but its inherently private nature. The autonomy of the person, after all, manifests itself-and must be respectedalso in the right to be free from intrusion, by the state or another person,
i.e., in what is commonly referred to as the "right to privacy." It is, literally, the freedom of thought that prevents its punishment in a constitutional regime of criminal law. 8,
So much for the constitutional constraints on the minimum elements
of a criminal offense: actus reus and mens rea. Constitutional criminal
law also calls for a rethinking of the law of defenses. Defenses are no
'84
longer discretionary, and gratuitous, exercises of sovereign mercy.
They are instead based on the recognition of the putative offender as a
person capable of choosing rightly, as well as wrongly. Under the preconstitutional view of criminal law, for example, self-defense was a type of
discretionary pardon. 5 Any homicide was an offense against the sovereign, "for depriving him of a subject," so that it was only right and proper
that homicide in self-defense be considered "excusable" (and therefore
pardonable), rather than "justifiable"' 6 (and therefore not unlawful to
begin with and thus in no need of a pardon). In a constitutional regime of
criminal law, by contrast, self-defense is based on an assertion of right,
rather than a plea for mercy. As Richard Wasserstrom has observed,
"[t]o claim or to acquire anything as a matter of right is crucially different
from seeking or obtaining it as through the grant of a privilege, the receipt of a favor, or the presence of a permission."'' 7 That difference, be-

183. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 164, at *151-*152 ("[T]he will of individuals is still left free: the

abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment.").
184. BAKER, supra note 173, at 6oi (finding homicide se defendendo only "excusable" (and therefore pardonable), rather than "justifiable" because any homicide deprives the king of a subject). The
constitutionalization of criminal law thus may require not only the recognition of certain defenses, but
also the transformation of excuse defenses into justifications.
185. See also Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of SelfDefense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1387-93 (1999) (discussing Hobbes and Aquinas on

self-defense as a permission, rather than a right).
186. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 164, at *177-*188 (discussing justifiable and excusable homicide).
187. Richard Wasserstrom, Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,61 J. PHIL. 628, 630
(1964). Note, however, the use of "privilege" in the fourteenth amendment ("privileges and immuni-

ties") and in tort law, where "privilege" is used as analogous to "justification" in criminal law.
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tween right and mercy, between entitlement and gratuity, is the difference between a constitutional and a preconstitutional system of criminal
law. I"
To see the constitutional basis for the right of self-defense (and,
analogously, the right to defend another person, or to defend one's-or
another's-property), one must first jettison the conception of crime as
an affront to the dignity of the state. Once crime is reconceptualized as
an interpersonal phenomenon, in which one person interferes with the
rights of another, the right of self-defense arises straightforwardly out of
the purposes of criminal law. The state is authorized to use the criminal
law to protect the rights of its constituents, and for no other purpose. To
the extent that it is incapable of performing this protective function in a
particular case-where the potential victim is faced with the immediate
need to protect himself against an imminent attack' which, by hypothesis, was not deterred by the threat of state punishment-a person has a
right to perform this function himself." ° To deny him this right is to reduce him to a mere object of government, rather than its one and only
subject, for the state has no function, and no reason for being, other than
to do that which it is incapable of doing in a situation giving rise to selfdefense. Only a preconstitutional system of criminal law that, like traditional English common law, concerns itself with protecting the state's
dignity-and once the king's, or now the public's, "peace" - as an end in
itself could mistake self-defense for an excuse requiring the discretionary
dispensation of mercy by the state.
Likewise, a state could not constitutionally do away with the necessity justification. Depriving a person of the authority to balance the merits of a particular course of action in light of the fundamental values of
the - his - legal system, even in emergency situations not of his own making, would treat him as incapable of the most basic tasks of self-

188.

Contrast Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3 d 1047,

1052

(7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e find no precedent es-

tablishing a constitutional right of self-defense in the criminal law."), with Griffin v. Martin, 785 F.2d
1172, 1187 n.37 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is difficult to the point of impossibility to imagine a right in any
state to abolish self defense altogether, thereby leaving one a Hobson's choice of almost certain death
through violent attack now or statutorily mandated death through trial and conviction of murder
later."); Isaac v. Engle, 646 F.2d Ii29, ii4O (6th Cir. I98O) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the Constitution prohibits a state from eliminating the justification of self-defense from its
criminal law.").
t89. For a typical formulation of self-defense, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(I) (1985) ("[T]he use
of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
person on the present occasion."). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney t998).
19o. Cf. Finkelstein, supra note 185, at 1397-1403 (finding self-defense a legal right based on "the
conditions of political legitimacy for a liberal state").
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government. 9' Only someone who utterly lacks the capacity for autonomy, because he cannot identify norms, cannot apply them to particular
situations, or cannot act according to them, could constitutionally be denied the necessity defense.'92
Whether this individual would be constitutionally entitled to raise a
defense based on his very incapacity is another question altogether. Is
there, in other words, a constitutional right to an insanity defense? There
is no question that a system dedicated to the principle of autonomy must
exculpate anyone who lacks the capacity for autonomy-or, in the words
of the insanity defense, the "capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."'93
The problem here is that, strictly speaking, someone with no capacity for
autonomy, and no chance of ever attaining this capacity, would not satisfy the minimum requirement for personhood and therefore also lack
standing to assert constitutional rights in general, and a constitutional
right to an insanity defense in particular. Such a radically incapacitated
person would indeed be incapable of self-government and therefore
could not be a subject of government and, as an object of government,
would have to rely on considerations of mercy, rather than principles of
justice. In this case, the state therefore would not be constitutionally
barred from refusing to recognize insanity as a defense.
And yet, just as American criminal law in fact protects fully
autonomous persons along with individuals who lack all capacity for
autonomy as victims, so it in fact recognizes the defense of insanity for
offenders. Even jurisdictions that have abandoned insanity as a separate
excuse defense do not go so far as to declare incapacity by reason of
mental disease irrelevant for purposes of criminal liability.'9 Whether
this is so because mercy is extended to those who lack minimum mental
191. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) ("Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to
avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that ... the harm or evil sought to
be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged...."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2).

192. Still, though an individual who lacks the capacity for self-government would not be constitutionally entitled to raise a necessity defense, a state would certainly not be prohibited from permitting
him to do so.
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0(1); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15.

194. See, e.g., Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001) (discussing "mens rea" approach to insanity,
which abandons insanity as a separate defense but affirms its relevance for purposes of determining
mens rea); cf.State v. Strasburg, ito P. 1020 (Wash. i9io) (affirming state constitutional right to insanity defense); Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 582 (Miss. 193) (same). Note, however, that thinking of
incapacity due to insanity as a mens rea defense runs the risk of obscuring the connection between
insanity and the capacity for autonomy, and thus deprives the insanity defense of its basic rationale.
The insanity defense turns on the incapacity to identify norms, apply them, or follow them, which renders an individual incapable of self-government.
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capacities for attribution of blame or because no human, no matter how
incapacitated in fact, is thought to have been deprived
of any and all po95
tential for (re)attaining that capacity, we cannot say.
The constitutional status of other excuse defenses, which turn on a
person's inability to exercise her capacity for autonomy rather than the
lack of that capacity, is somewhat more straightforward.' A person acting under duress, for instance, cannot be held criminally responsible for a
choice that is not truly hers, even if the act itself might be described as
her own, so that she meets some minimum voluntary act requirement.
Acts committed under the exceptional and extreme circumstances that
give rise to duress as an excuse defense-the actual or threatened use of
force that "a person of reasonable firmness in [her] situation would have
been unable to resist""7 -cannot be described as manifestations of the actor's capacity for autonomy, i.e., of the capacity that makes her a person.
To punish her for such an act thus would amount to treating her as something other-and less-than a person, in violation of her personal dignity.'i9
Whether the defense of entrapment can claim a similar constitutional
basis-at least as a matter of substantive, rather than procedural, criminal
law-is doubtful. As a rule, the entrapment defense does not require the
sort of overbearing pressure that duress requires. There is no requirement
that the entrapped person-or some reasonable person in his situationhave been unable to withstand the pressure. Insofar as entrapment requires merely that the police officer "induce[] or encourage[]"'" the suspect, entrapment applies even if the suspect is not prevented from
exercising his capacity for autonomy by not engaging in criminal conduct.
Ironically, however, it is the defense of entrapment that enjoys constitutional backing, at least in certain-in practice largely hypothetical -cases
that rise to the level of "outrageous government conduct."2" This anomaly,
however, is attributable to the familiar anomaly that restricts constitutionalization to matters of criminal procedure, rather than of substantive
criminal law. For the outrageous conduct defense serves the procedural
function of deterring police misconduct, rather than the substantive one of

195. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26 (discussing extension of criminal law to protect
individuals lacking the capacity for autonomy).
196. On the distinction between inability and incapacity excuses, see DUBBER, supra note lO3, at
267.
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(l) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00.
198. Cf.Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocationand Duress, 1992 CRIM. L. REv. 706.
199. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05.
200. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973) (regarding U.S. Constitution); People v.
Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978) (regarding N.Y. Constitution).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 55:50 9

deterring, or simply appropriately punishing, the defendant's criminal conduct." '
The constitutional status of the provocation defense is also problematic, though probably less so. Like entrapment, it does not require that the
defendant be unable to exercise his capacity for autonomy in certain circumstances, only that he act "under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse .....
Then again, unlike entrapment, it does not result in complete exculpation, but only in a mitigation of punishment, presumably on the
ground that the actor's ability to exercise his capacity for autonomy was
only partly compromised or "influenced." Clearly, under a constitutional
regime of criminal law, the defendant would have a right to have the factfinder consider any factor that pertains to his inability to exercise his capacity for autonomy. Whether the legislature, however, is constitutionally
obligated to mitigate punishment for provoked conduct in the traditional
way, by reducing liability from murder to manslaughter, is another question. In fact, if the defendant had a right to the provocation defense, one
would expect it to extend beyond the historical boundaries of the law of
homicide. The inability - or partial inability - to exercise one's capacity for
autonomy is always relevant to an assessment of criminal liability, no matter what the conduct.
2.
Punishment
There is general agreement that American constitutional law places
limits on what punishment the state may threaten to inflict, and actually
inflict, on a person who is convicted of criminal conduct. Although, as we
have seen, the general requirements for criminal liability are mostly beyond constitutional scrutiny, the consequences of meeting these requirements are not. Thus, the Constitution is oddly enough said to be
silent on who may be convicted, but not on how he may be punished
once he has been convicted.
a. Appropriateness
Even in the constitutional law of punishment (as opposed to the constitutional law of crime), however, the protection of the offender's personal dignity has not received sufficient attention. The constitutional law
of punishment instead tends to be reduced to the question of "proportionality," which, as we have already noted above, does little to structure
analysis without a clear understanding of what is to be proportionate to
what. 3 Further, this exclusive focus on proportionalityignores the prior
201. See MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES § 2.13, at 406.
202. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(I)(b); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2).
203. See supra text accompanying notes I16-20.
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question of appropriateness.There may be punishments that are unconstitutional regardless of the crime committed. Corporal punishments, including whipping, come to mind. Here it is interesting to note that
whipping-or other essentially demeaning punishments like the stock or
the pillory-were never ruled unconstitutional. They were discontinued
in the course of the nineteenth century, but not on account of their unconstitutionality, or more precisely a judicialfinding of unconstitutionality. In particular settings - most notably in prisons - whipping continued
to be used until well into the twentieth century. 4
Since the constitutionality of demeaning punishments was never at
issue, it goes without saying that the reason for their unconstitutionality
was never made explicit either. Still, we may presume that a statute providing for a punishment of whipping would not pass constitutional muster today, though not necessarily because it is inconsistent with the
dignity of the punished, but because it is "unusual" given that it has
fallen into disuse over time. If, however, all or most (or perhaps many)
states would decide to reintroduce the pillory as a criminal sanction, the
federal Constitution-as currently interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court -presumably would not stand in their way, since it may be "cruel,"
but it would not be "cruel and unusual."20 5
The only substantive

-rather

than relative -limitations

on the ap-

propriateness of a punishment derive from the fact that the cruel and unusual punishments clause "was designed to outlaw particular modes of
punishment, '206 in particular "the rack or the stake, or any of those horrid
modes of torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of
fiendish passion.""' In other words, it is not any interference with the
dignity of the punished that renders certain types of punishment inappropriate from a constitutional standpoint, but whatever evidence they
provide for the inappropriateness of the motivations driving the punisher. The state-or the official acting in behalf of the state-could not
constitutionally punish if it was motivated by "fiendish passion" or, more
generally, "malice."'

204. Cf Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (reviewing prison disciplinary measures in
Arkansas, including "such devices as the crank telephone or teeter board" and "whipping to the bare
skin of prisoners").
205. For the significance of this formulation of the Eighth Amendment, see, for example, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (i99). Some state constitutions contain different formulations, including "cruel or unusual."
206. Id. at 981.
207. JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF ExPosmON OF THE CONSTnTUrION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (Philadelphia, Hogan & Thompson 1840) (quoted in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 981).
208. State v. Mabrey, 64 N.C. 592, 593 (1870).
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It is no accident that these limits reflect the constraints that-in theory, if not generally in practice-traditionally had been placed on the authority of the householder and the slaveholder to discipline those under
his charge."° In fact, they manifest a hierarchical view of government that
draws a sharp distinction between the governor and the governed, between the punisher and the punished, a view that considers the objects of
government as rightless and, literally, at the mercy of their superiors."'
It bears repeating that this view is radically inconsistent with the idea
of constitutional criminal law, which rests on a basic commitment to respecting the dignity of all persons, no matter where they might fall in the
social hierarchy of a given political community, and no matter "on what
side of the law" they may find themselves in a particular case. In a constitutional regime of criminal law demeaning punishments are inappropriate, not because they reflect badly on the punisher, but for the simple
reason that they are demeaning to the punished. No matter how not
"unusual" demeaning punishments may be, they are inappropriate because they treat their object as something other-and less-than a person. They are unconstitutional even if they are not motivated by malice,
a malignant heart, or fiendish passion, but by a calculated desire to demean-no matter what their ultimate purpose might be-for it is that
very desire that makes them inappropriate.
Whipping and spectacles of public humiliation -such as the stock
and the pillory-are incompatible with personal dignity because they are
so firmly associated with disciplinary measures traditionally used by
householders, and by preconstitutional states built on the model of a patriarchal household, that they treat, and are perceived to treat, their objects as wayward inferior members of the household who dared to
challenge the householder's unlimited authority to govern. They powerfully and unequivocally manifest the unbridgeable power gap between
the governor and the governed. As such, they are entirely inconsistent
with the deep commitment to autonomy, or self-government, that undergirds the constitutional state, and therefore also a constitutional regime
of criminal law.
Some demeaning punishments also offend the dignity of their object
by affixing to them a label, or a status. The more permanent the label,
the greater the incompatibility of the punishment with the autonomy of
the punished. There was a time, of course, when offenders were regularly
branded with markers identifying their crime of conviction."' These
209. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.

2io. See generally DUBBER, supra note 2.
211. E.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, BILL FOR PROPORTIONING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Julian P. Bond
et al. eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1950) (1778) (discussing disfigurement as penalty for branding). See
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markers became identifying features that defined the person bearing
them and denied the possibility of behavior inconsistent with them. A
branded forger could not ever be anything but a forger and it was only
the brand-and whatever other forms of state interference deemed necessary-that kept him from acting according to his identity. The capacity
for autonomous choice was denied, and-as a matter of fact-so was the
opportunity to exercise it.
Recently, attempts have been made to reintroduce demeaning punishments into American criminal law." ' Although these punishmentsincluding forcing offenders to wear placards listing their crime of conviction, having them display bumper stickers identifying their crime of conviction, or broadcasting their faces and, in many cases, personal
information on television, on the Internet, or in public places in their
neighborhood-avoid the physical components of more traditional demeaning punishments like whipping, the stock, and the pillory, they do
not make any effort to change their import. In fact, the elimination of
distracting physical aspects of the new shaming punishments only serves
to emphasize their demeaning message." 3 As such, they are clearly incompatible with the dignity of their objects and for that reason have no
place in a constitutional regime of criminal law.
But shaming punishments-traditional or contemporary-are not
the only types of punishment that are inconsistent with the dignity of the
punished. So is any perpetual punishment, most importantly life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The infliction of perpetual punishment categorically denies the punished's capacity for autonomy by
dismissing the possibility that he will ever lead a law-abiding life, i.e., a
life inconsistent with his categorization as a "lifer." In the words of the
German Constitutional Court, "the state strikes at the very heart of human dignity if [it] treats the prisoner without regard to the development
of his personality and strips him of all hope of ever regaining his freedom.... 4 Accordingly, the Court recognized the right of a prisoner serving
a life sentence to have his eligibility for release reviewed on a regular basis after having served fifteen years. To comply with the Court's ruling,
the German Penal Code now provides that a court shall release the life
also id. (pillory for grand larceny (thirty minutes) and petty larceny (fifteen minutes)); U.S. CONST.
ART.I, § 9 (prohibiting bills of attainder).
212. E.g., Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:A Proposalfor Reform of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,42 J.L. & ECON. 365 0999).
213. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (1978) (discussing transformation of punish-

ment from physical to psychological interference).
214. 45 BVerfGE 187, 245 (1977). This decision is discussed in detail in DIRK VAN ZYL SMrr, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ch.

4

(2002); see

P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 314-15 (1994).

also

DAVID
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prisoner if "the particular gravity of the convicted person's guilt does not
require... continued execution" of the prison sentence. Early release
"can be justified upon consideration of the security interests of the general public," and-as a final prerequisite that reemphasizes the significance of the prisoner's autonomy-"the convicted person consents. 2. 5
The constitutionality of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole has never been seriously questioned in the United States. The
only mode of punishment, in fact, that has attracted any sustained constitutional attention has been the death penalty. Efforts to end capital punishment, however, have relied on a "death is different" strategy, which
emphasized the uniqueness of the death penalty-most importantly its
irrevocability. This strategy has been remarkably successful. The U.S.
Supreme Court for decades has recognized that death is indeed different.
At the same time, however, the Court has affirmed the constitutionality
of capital punishment. As a result, the "death is different" strategy has
become a victim of its own success. Not only is capital punishment constitutional so is, a fortiori,any other mode of punishment. If the death penalty is constitutional, so the assumption goes, then surely any otherlesser-penalty is constitutional as well, including life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.
But to say that death is different is not to say that death is different
because it is more serious. Death is different in quality, not in quantity. It
is this qualitative difference that makes possible the Supreme Court's
pursuit of a death penalty jurisprudence independent of the jurisprudence of other punishments, most importantly imprisonment. But this
same qualitative difference means that the constitutionality of capital
punishment does not imply the constitutionality of life imprisonment any
more than the unconstitutionality of capital punishment would imply the
unconstitutionality of life imprisonment.
In constitutional criminal law, the appropriateness of the death penalty as a type of punishment turns on the same question as that of any
other punishment: Is it compatible with the dignity of the person of the
punished, specifically his capacity for autonomy? Now insofar as the
death penalty is inflicted on the basis of a diagnosis of an unalterable
characteristic, be it dangerousness (incapacitation) or wickedness (character-based retributivism), it is as incompatible with the principle of
autonomy as is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (or
any other disability manifesting the inability to exercise one's capacity

215.

§ 57a StGB (F.R.G.).

February

20041

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

for autonomy, such as the disenfranchisement of felons'6). And indeed
Justice Brennan argued in Furman v. Georgia that capital punishment is
unconstitutional precisely because it treats "members of the human race
as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded" in violation of
"the fundamental premise of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishments]
Clause that even the vilest
217 criminal remains a human being possessed of
common human dignity.1
b. Proportionality
Under a preconstitutional state-focused view of criminal law, the
proportionality of punishment is analyzed like its appropriateness. Punishment is disproportionate and therefore "cruel and unusual" only insofar as it reveals the punisher's improper motivation. If the punishment
inflicted is "manifestly excessive and disproportionate to the fault," and
employs "unusual or unlawful instruments," then and only then is it unconstitutional.
In noncapital cases, the Supreme Court has decided that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits only certain "grossly disproportionate" penalties.
A noncapital punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate only if it
is grossly disproportionate to the "severity of the crime" (and is therefore cruel) and is significantly more severe if compared to penalties inflicted in similar circumstances by the punisher as well as by others (and
therefore unusual as well).2 9
No punishment has been found unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court under this test. A mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for simple possession (i.e., possession
without the intent to distribute) of more than 650 grams cocaine is not
unconstitutionally disproportionate, 20 nor is a prison sentence of twentyfive years to life under California's "three-strikes" law"' for shoplifting
three golf clubs from a pro shop.2
216. On this remarkably widespread practice in the United States, analogous to the longabandoned continental notion of "civil death," see Patricia Allard & Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote:
An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon DisenfranchisementLaws 2 (2000) (on file with Hastings
Law Journal) (finding almost four million Americans disenfranchised because of felony conviction);
see also George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisementas Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (i999); Nora V. Demleitner, ContinuingPayment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisementas an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000).
217. 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
227, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. JOEL PRENTIss BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 532 (Chicago, T.H. Flood
1892) (quoting Butler v. McClellan, 4 F. Cas. 905,909,910 (D. Me. 1831) (No. 2242)).
219. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1186-9o (2003).
22o. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,961,966 (m99I).
221. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12(a)-(d) (West 1999).
222. Ewing, 123 S. Ct. at I189-9o.
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The Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence in noncapital
cases can best be explained as a continuation of the long standing practice of granting householders virtually unlimited discretion to discipline
members of their household. Most important is the almost complete absence of constraint. Just as householders traditionally were free to enforce their authority-and to protect their "peace"-by any means
necessary, so the Supreme Court today shows "substantial deference" to
the states when it comes to deciding how to protect their peace or dignity.223 It is no accident that most noncapital proportionality cases before
the Supreme Court dealt with harsh recidivist penalties. No one flaunts
the authority of the state more openly and insistently than the repeat offender. As a blatant threat to the authority and dignity of the state, recidivists must be dealt with decisively and harshly. In a series of cases,
and most recently in last term's Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that it is not willing to interfere with the states' discretion to discipline recidivists as they see fit.224

At the same time, constraints are not entirely absent, even though
they have very little bite in practice. Note that to be deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate, a penalty must not only be "grossly disproportionate" to the offense, a hurdle that is very difficult to clear. (Ewing's
life sentence for shoplifting did not clear it, for example.) But a finding of
gross disproportionality is not enough. As long as the state in question
punishes similar conduct with similar gross disproportionality or enough
other states do, the punishment is not sufficiently unusual to be unconstitutional. In other words, only the most incontrovertible evidence of malice on the part of the punisher (i.e., the state) will test the constitutional
limits on punishment. Only a truly exceptional episode of brutality will
threaten the state's impunity regarding punishment.
In capital cases, the Supreme Court has developed a less toothless
proportionality test. (It has actually invalidated some sentences under
it. 2'5) Instead of gross disproportionality, simple disproportionality is
enough, with no need to undertake an intra- and interjurisdictional
analysis. This exception too is consistent with the traditional practice of
granting deference to the householder disciplinarian. For already the
medieval lord was prohibited from depriving his serf of "life or limb," or

223.

See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at io16, 1021 (White, J., dis-

senting).
224. Ewing, 123 S. Ct. at mi9o; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at ioo9 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370,374 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,284 (598o).
225. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (regarding felony murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (regarding adult rape).
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"slaying or maiming" him.226 Likewise, even the slaveholder was prohib-

ited-in theory-from killing or disabling his slave. 27 (There were two
reasons for these limitations. First, the householder was not authorized
to deprive the king of the life or use of a subject. Second, killing one's
serf or slave made no economic sense, except in extraordinary circumstances, so that it gave rise to a suspicion of malice."') One would therefore expect the Supreme Court to take a harder look at both capital
punishment and serious corporal punishment causing permanent injury.
Still, the Supreme Court's capital proportionality jurisprudenceand to a lesser extent even its noncapital version-can also be read as
pointing in the direction of a view of proportionality less beholden to a
preconstitutional regime of criminal law. In constitutional criminal law
the focus of proportionality analysis is shifted from the punisher to the
punished, and from the norms of proper household governance to the
rights of persons. Like inappropriate punishment, disproportionate punishment is not objectionable because it reveals malice on the part of the
punisher, but because it treats the punished as something less than a person.
There are glimpses of this approach in the Court's proportionality
opinions. Where it has undertaken a proportionality analysis, the Court
has compared the punishment to the "seriousness" of the offense, which
it has interpreted as encompassing both the harm caused-or threatened-and the offender's culpability. In capital cases, for instance, the
Court has paid particular attention to the proportionality of punishment
to the defendant's mental state, understood as "a critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases.' 229
Similarly, it has struck down a statute prescribing capital punishment for
rape of an adult woman on the ground that the punishment was disproportionate to the seriousness of the harm.23
The Supreme Court's limited proportionality jurisprudence thus
contains within itself the seeds of its own expansion. In fact, the Court's
occasional explorations of proportionality in capital cases might be
rounded out into a fuller theory of proportionality, which then could be
extended past the "death is different" hurdle to cover all cases of punishment, and-yet more comprehensively-to all cases of state action,

226. 1 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 120, at 415-I6,
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230. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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thereby integrating the ultima ratio principle, which scrutinizes the state's
decision to invoke the criminal law in the first place, and not just a particular criminal sanction. Whatever federalist constraints one might then
place on federal courts' federal constitutional review of state statutes is
another question.23 '
The Court's recent decision in Ewing is a step in the wrong direction.
There the Court upheld a life sentence imposed under California's
"three-strikes" law232 for shoplifting three golf clubs, arguing that this
punishment was proportionate to the "gravity" of Ewing's offense, given
that the state had a legitimate interest in incapacitating him on the basis
of his criminal record. 33 The seriousness of an offense, however, should
not be confused with its significance as a symptom of future dangerousness. Seriousness instead functions as a principled limit on the sanction
that might be indicated on the basis of a dangerousness diagnosis.
Still, Ewing did reaffirm the Court's focus on the gravity of the offense as the relevant point of comparison in proportionality analysis. To
the extent that offense seriousness factors in both the offender's culpability and the harm caused, this approach is not inconsistent with a proportionality analysis under a regime of constitutional criminal law. An
inquiry into the offender's culpability is clearly relevant to an appreciation of the crime as the act of a person choosing to exercise his capacity
for autonomy, albeit in a violation of criminal norms. An inquiry into
harm is similarly appropriate, provided the harm is restricted to violations of the rights of persons, rather than offenses against the dignity of
the state.
C.

VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE SPECIAL PART AND THE RIGHT TO CONSENT

The much overdue transformation of American criminal law from a
tool for the discretionary maintenance of royal, and then state, dignity to
the most intrusive, but not necessarily most effective, means for the principled protection of the dignity of persons also has wideranging implications for the so-called "special part" of criminal law. 34 This is a vast
subject and much of it is beyond the scope of this Article. Still, some illustrative examples will be discussed.

231. This two-step approach also is implicit in the Court's two-part proportionality test for noncapital cases, which calls for a "seriousness" inquiry first and for intra- and interjurisdictional comparison second. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (199).
232. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(i), 117O.12(a)-(d) (West 1999).
233. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189-90 (2003).
234. The special part deals with the particular offenses that define the content and the scope of
criminal law, rather than the general principles of criminal liability that apply to all offenses across the
board. Cf supra note 178.
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Homicide, for instance, would be reconceptualized as a violation of
the dignity of the person who saw his life taken by another, rather than
as a violation of the "peace and dignity" of the state. 35 This shift in the
focus from state dignity to human dignity would have implications for,
among other things, the law of double jeopardy. As we saw earlier on, a
murder would constitute a single offense, against the murder victim.23 6 It
therefore could not be punished twice, contra Heath, no matter how
many different sovereigns might find their dignity to have been offended,
for no "person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." The abandonment of the so-called dual sovereignty exception would significantly reshape American criminal law, as it
would not only bar successive prosecutions for the same offense by different states (as in Heath), but by the states and the federal government
as well.237
While criminal law would concern itself with protecting the dignity
of persons, rather than of sovereigns, states, or institutions, it would not
seek to safeguard their social dignity-or their human dignity-in other
words, their dignity as persons. Social status, by itself, is of no concern to
the law, as something to be upgraded, maintained, or degraded for that
matter. The special part of criminal law therefore has no place for crimes
against social dignity, such as libel or slander, as they have traditionally
been understood, and as they remain on the books to this day.3' While
the interest in one's honor is not a right worthy of protection by the
criminal law, any act that violates the human dignity of another and
thereby disrespects another as a person, would qualify for state intervention. Whether it requires state intervention, and more specifically state
intervention in the form of criminal law, is another matter, of course.
Needless to say, offenses against the social dignity of nonhuman entities- like states, for instance-are likewise excluded.
This revision of the notion of an offense also implies a revision of the
notion of criminal harm, a notoriously important, and notoriously under-

235. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82,93 (985).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
237. Currently, the matter of successive and dual prosecutions under federal and state law is not
governed by law, constitutional or statutory, but by an entirely discretionary "statement of policy."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2002) ("Petite Policy"). This

policy makes no mention of double jeopardy or other rights, but instead is formulated exclusively in
terms of matters of "substantial federal interests," convenience, and efficiency.
238. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1964); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d
IO87, io88 (8th Cir. i973) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1948)). While the Supreme Court has paid
considerable attention to the constitutional parameters of civil libel, it has largely ignored criminal
libel. Compare N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-92 (1964) (regarding civil libel), with Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251-67 (1952) (regarding criminal libel).
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specified, concept in self-consciously liberal accounts of criminal law,
ever since John Stuart Mill set out the "harm principle" in On Liberty.'39
In a constitutional regime of criminal law, criminal harm is not simply
pain, discomfort, or unease, all of which are phenomena that may be experienced by many creatures. Harm instead is harm to human rights, and
in particular to the basic human right to autonomy, which gives rise to
human dignity. As Jefferson understood, it is this harm that persons constitute political communities to prevent and, if it cannot be prevented, to
punish.40 Criminal harm, in other words, is harm to a person, and harm
to a person's very personhood, as opposed to his morally irrelevant attributes, such as his social dignity. That means criminal harm is not harm
to the state, nor harm to the state's dignity, nor harm to a community, or
entity, or corporation, or interest, however "public."''
Conduct that qualifies as harmless under this autonomy-based reinterpretation of Mill's harm principle cannot be criminalized in a constitutional regime of criminal law. One example of such harmless conduct is
consensual homosexual (or, more broadly, "deviate") sex. Only last
term, in Lawrence v. Texas, 4' the Supreme Court struck down a homosexual sodomy statute on the ground that the proscribed conduct does
not inflict harm in the relevant sense. (The statute prohibited "engag[ing]
in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. 1243)
Just seventeen years earlier, in Bowers v. Hardwick,'" the Court had upheld a similar statute on the ground that homosexual sex offended the
moral sensibilities of the public or, more precisely, of "a majority of the
electorate in Georgia."
In Lawrence, the Court recognized the constitutional impropriety of
using the power of the criminal law to protect not the human dignity of
individual state constituents, but the sensibilities of the state community
as a whole (and as presumably reflected in legislation).'45 The point here
is not simply that the majority may not use the criminal law to protect or
manifest its moral sensibilities and thereby oppress a minority it defines

239. MILL, supra note 73, at Io-Ii ("[Tlhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others ...");
see also I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984); Finkelstein, supra note I, at 371-82.
240. JEFFERSON, supra note 211, § I.
241. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see DUBBER, supra note 3.
242. 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
243. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.o6(a) (Vernon 2003).
244. 478 U.S. i86, 196 (1986).
245. See also Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. i98o) (quoting Mill's discussion of
the harm principle in striking down the Pennsylvania sodomy statute).
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as "deviate." Not even the "moral health" of the public as a whole counts
as a protected interest in a constitutional regime of criminal law.
Homosexual sodomy as proscribed by the Texas statute could not be
criminalized because it did not violate anyone's autonomy. As with heterosexual intercourse, whether "deviate" or not, there are of course cases
where homosexual sex may-and indeed must-be criminalized, i.e.,
whenever the conduct is not consensual. Lawrence thus illustrates a more
general point about the significance of consent as a defense, or rather as
a bar against criminalization. In the presence of consent, invoking the
criminal law is inappropriate not only because the conduct is harmless in
the relevant sense-so that punishing the "offender" would violate his
autonomy without vindicating the autonomy of the "victim"246-but also
because doing so would violate the autonomy of the "victim." The victim,
in other words, has a right to consent.
"Consent" is the main doctrinal category in substantive criminal law
that functions as a placeholder for considerations of the victim's personhood, i.e., his capacity for autonomy. American criminal law has yet to
appreciate fully the central significance of the consent defense. That defense stands as a constant reminder that criminal law is about persons
first. Consent as a reflection of the criminal law's basis in personal
autonomy is less a defense than a general limitation, less an exception
than the rule. It finds its broadest recognition in the Model Penal Code.
According to the Code, consent is a defense if non-consent is an element
of the offense charged, or if it "precludes the infliction of the harm or
evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. ' 47 That
harm, however, is always the interference with the victim's basic human
right, to be free from interference with her autonomy. That interference
is absent in the presence of consent.
One therefore would expect consent to be a defense to, or nonconsent an implicit element of, every offense. It is not, however, not even
in the Model Code. The Code instead preserves the traditional, and traditionally ill-supported, exception for "serious bodily harm."
Attempts to justify exceptions to a general consent defense tend to
consist of general references to the preconstitutional view of criminal
law. The criminal law ignores individual victims' consent, so it is said, be246. See, e.g., ROXIN, supra note 70, § 13 Nos. 2 & 70; Theodor Lenckner, STRAFGESETZBUCH:
KOMMENTAR §§ 32 ff no.48 (Adolf Sch6nke & Horst Schr6der eds., I997); Knut Amelung, Uber
Freiheit und Freiwilligkeitauf der Opferseite der Strafnorm, I999 GOLTDAMMERS ARCHIV 182; Wilfried
Kfiper, ,Autonomie , Irrturn und Zwang bei mittelbarer Taterschaft und Einwilligung, 1986 JURISTEN
ZEITUNG

219; ALFRED
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cause it is not about individual victims, but about the state (or the
king)." This view of the criminal law, however, is not only inconsistent
with the basic principles of a constitutional system of government. (Consent, after all, is the central manifestation of the capacity for autonomy in
modern political theory, which recognizes the "consent of the governed"
as the only source of legitimacy. 49) It also proves too much. For if the
state were indeed the victim of every crime, then consent should be a defense to none.
A failure to recognize consent as a defense amounts to a violation of
the prima facie victim's fundamental right to autonomy. It also violates
the apparent offender's right to autonomy, assuming his facially criminal
conduct manifested an agreement between the offender and the apparent victim (as opposed to merely carrying out the "victim's" orders, say).
Punishing the apparent offender therefore would do nothing to vindicate
autonomy. On the contrary, it would deny the autonomy of offender and
victim alike.
The Supreme Court recently has explored the constitutional significance of consent to homicide, one of the most dramatic applications of
the defense. In Glucksberg v. Washington5 ' and Vacco v. Quill,5' it affirmed states' authority to criminalize assisted suicide, which is easily
reconceptualized as consensual homicide. To the extent Glucksberg and
Quill disavow any constitutional constraints on the state's authority to
reject a consent defense, they are clearly inconsistent with a constitutional regime of criminal law. Perhaps, however, they can be read not as
affirming the constitutional irrelevance of victim consent, but more narrowly as scrutinizing the effectiveness of that consent. Clearly, in every
case of consent, and in none more urgently than in cases of consent to
homicide, the victim's assent must in fact qualify as consent; i.e., it must
actually reflect an exercise of the victim's capacity for autonomy. 5

248. See, e.g., LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 8o, at 481.
249. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776) ("[T]o secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
250. 521 U.S. 702,735 (1997).
251. 521 U.S. 793, 808-o9 (1997).
252. The Model Penal Code's general provision on consent conveniently sets out guidelines for
determining the effectiveness of consent in a particular case, as opposed to as a general matter of constitutional, or criminal, law:
Ineffective Consent. [A]ssent does not constitute consent if:
(a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to
constitute the offense; or
(b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth [or age, more generally], mental disease
or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a
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CONCLUSION

American criminal law today remains rooted in a preconstitutional
model of crime and punishment. Crime, in this model, is an offense to the
dignity of the state, and punishment the reaffirmation of that dignity. It is
basic blackletter law that criminal law is an exercise of the state's power
to police, which is the modern manifestation of the householder's ancient
authority to discipline the members of his household. Like that age-old
patriarchal power, the police power is largely unconstrained in theory,
virtually unconstrained in practice, and differentiates categorically between the superior householder and his household, between governor
and governed, and between punisher and punished.
Constitutionalizing criminal law requires a reconception and revision
of American criminal law as the most radical means by which the modern
democratic state discharges its function: to protect its constituents against
interference with their rights as persons, be it by another person or by
the state itself. A constitutionalized criminal law must respect and safeguard the inviolability of all persons, offenders and victims alike. The offender does not cease to be a person upon commission of a crime, nor
upon conviction or punishment for it. At the same time, the victim retains her personhood even in the face of the offender's assault.
Attempting to protect the dignity of offenders as persons therefore
is only one side of the coin that is constitutional criminal law. What is at
stake is the protection of the dignity of persons as persons, be they "offenders" or "victims." Insofar as constitutions embody the state's fundamental obligation to uphold the personal dignity of its constituents, and
the basic right to autonomy that underlies it, constitutional criminal law
must concern itself with the autonomy of offenders and victims alike.
Constitutional criminal law thus limits the state's law of crime and punishment on both ends: protecting victims' personal autonomy against violation by other persons may require the use of criminal law, while
protecting offenders' personal autonomy against violation by the state
may prohibit it.253 Given the enormous scope and continuing expansion of
reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute
the offense; or
(d) it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law
defining the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2. 1(3).

253. Examples of a constitutional duty to criminalize might not only include conduct that violates
constitutional rights (such as the right to life, liberty, and property)-so that a legislature, for instance,
could not constitutionally decide to do away with the crime of theft, for instance-but also conduct
identified in the constitution as punishable (e.g., treason (U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 3), "piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations" (U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8)).
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modern criminal law, the latter, prohibitory prong of constitutional
criminal law will require our most immediate attention. The problem
with criminal law in the war on crime of the past thirty years, after all,
has not been undercriminalization but the systematic erosion of basic
principles of criminal law, including actus reus, mens rea,254 and defenses
such as insanity,255 intoxication,25 6 and even self-defense."'
This Article has focused on substantive criminal law. Still, the basic
principle of "dignity and self-determination" that underlies not only the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments and
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of due process, but
the Constitution as a whole, guides the constitutionalization of all aspects
of criminal law, including not only the definition of criminal norms (substantive criminal law), but also their application (criminal procedure) and
the infliction of sanctions for their violation (prison law). Constitutional
substantive criminal law eventually must be integrated into a comprehensive account of constitutional criminal law. The first step toward such
an integration, however, is ending substantive criminal law's status as the
poor constitutional cousin of procedural criminal law, which has long attracted the Supreme Court's attention as a form of state action that demands close constitutional scrutiny. This Article suggests why, and how,
this first step should be taken.

Many cases of undercriminalization may be characterized as underinclusive criminalization, and thus
deprive certain persons of equal protection of the (criminal) law. An obvious example would be the
failure to criminalize assault by whites upon blacks if assault by blacks upon whites is criminal, a common characteristic of American law prior to the Civil War. Some of the Supreme Court's opinions rejecting constitutional challenges to criminalization, particularly the recent opinions upholding assisted
suicide statutes, can be read as recognizing a constitutional duty to criminalize violations of constitutional rights, such as the right to life in the case of the assisted suicide cases. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (997); cf. Rodriguez v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1993] S.C.R.
519, 520-21 (Canadian Supreme Court upholding criminal prohibition of assisted suicide as protection
of right to life); TIEDEMANN, supra note 15, at 50-55 (discussing constitutional duty to criminalize in
German law).
254. See generally DUBBER, supra note 3.

255. See Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 85 (Nev. 2001) (discussing abandonment of insanity defense).
256. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 51-56 (1996) (discussing abandonment in intoxication defense).
257. People v. Almodovar, 464 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. 1984) (discussing no defense of self-defense
against possession offenses).

